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MCCLEARY: POSITIVE RIGHTS, SEPARATION OF
POWERS, AND TAXPAYER PROTECTIONS IN
WASHINGTON’S STATE CONSTITUTION
Kristen L. Fraser*
INTRODUCTION
When the delegates to Washington’s constitutional convention
borrowed a clause from Florida’s 1868 Reconstruction constitution1 to
introduce Washington’s 1889 education article, they little could have
guessed that the “paramount duty” would become the most expensive
phrase in state fiscal history, committing future taxpayers to support
state K-12 education obligations that likely exceed $20 billion per fiscal
biennium.2 In the landmark Seattle School District v. State3 case, the
* Kristen L. Fraser holds degrees in law and political science from the University of Washington.
She is an adjunct professor of law at the Seattle University School of Law and senior counsel to the
Office of Program Research, which provides non-partisan legal and budget support to the
Washington State House of Representatives. The author’s views are her own and offered in her
personal and academic capacities; they do not necessarily reflect advice given in her legislative
capacity or the views of the House, its members, or its administration. The author would like to
thank Professor Hugh Spitzer for his review of earlier drafts.
1. “It is the paramount duty of the State to make ample provision for the education of all the
children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference.” FLA. CONST. of 1868 art.
XII, § 1. Florida’s 1885 anti-Reconstruction constitution removed “paramount duty” and “ample” in
favor of the less expansive “liberal maintenance.” FLA. CONST. OF 1885 art. XII, § 1.
2. In the 2015–2017 biennial budget, State Near-General Fund plus Opportunity Pathways
(NFGS + Op Path) appropriations for K-12 education totaled $18.156 billion. This equals 47.5% of
the total appropriations of $38.2 billion from these accounts. (The NGFS consists of the state
General Fund (GFS) and the Education Legacy Trust Account, plus the Opportunity Pathways
Account.) STATE OF WASHINGTON, LEGISLATIVE BUDGET NOTES: 2015–17 BIENNIUM & 2015
SUPPLEMENT 277 [hereinafter BUDGET NOTES], http://leap.leg.wa.gov/leap/budget/lbns/2015
LBN.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFG5-847J]; see infra note 150 and accompanying text (describing
nature of shortfall in state salary allocations). Estimates of the additional state funding necessary to
address the shortfall in state salary allocations vary. Working from the assumption that ninety
percent of actual average statewide district compensation payments to employees in the state-funded
salary base is properly the state’s responsibility, the 2015 House budget chair published an estimate
of an additional $3.5 billion per biennium. Ross Hunter, McCleary Phase II, ROSS HUNTER (Aug.
24, 2015), http://s485995026.onlinehome.us/2015/08/mccleary-phase-ii/ [https://perma.cc/MW3AMFLG]. A bipartisan solution advocated by state senators in the 2015 legislative session also
assumed a salary allocation funding gap of approximately that amount. Editorial, Capital Gains Tax
Is Best Plan to Fund Senate Bipartisan Plan on Education, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 14, 2015, at A20.
The McCleary plaintiffs suggest that the additional state funding required is $10 billion per
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Washington State Supreme Court first interpreted the “paramount duty”
clause of the Washington State Constitution to create a corresponding
“true” or “absolute” right on the part of the state’s school children to
receive an amply funded education.4 In his concurring opinion in Seattle
School District, Justice Robert. F. Utter urged a conciliatory judicial
response to the Legislature’s efforts, recommending that the Court
respect the Legislature’s policy-setting processes by affirming the
reforms the Legislature had enacted to respond to that lawsuit.5
In McCleary v. State,6 the Washington State Supreme Court
reaffirmed Seattle School District, and it initially appeared to consider
Justice Utter’s earlier caution, offering deference to the Legislature’s
endeavors by endorsing recently enacted legislation as a “promising
reform package” which, “if fully funded,” would remedy school funding
deficiencies.7 But, in a crucial departure from Seattle School District, the
McCleary Court retained jurisdiction to monitor legislative progress
toward article IX implementation. Building on McCleary’s renewed and
expanded positive rights jurisprudence, the Court’s subsequent
enforcement actions have resulted in a confrontation8 between the state’s
legislative and judicial arms, a showdown in which the Court claims
extraordinary authority to scrutinize the adequacy of the Legislature’s
school funding decisions.9
In this two-branch game of “Chicken,”10 the Court has thrice ordered
biennium. Joseph O’Sullivan & Jim Brunner, Court to State: Pay Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 14,
2015, at A6.
3. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
4. Id. at 511–13, 585 n.13, 585 P.2d at 91–93; see also WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the
paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within
its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” (emphasis
added)).
5. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 547–51, 585 P.2d at 109–19 (Utter, J., concurring).
6. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012).
7. Id. at 484, 269 P.3d at 231.
8. Such confrontations are discussed in Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional
Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2007). In this definition of a “showdown,” a disagreement
between branches over government ends with “ambiguous acquiescence,” a total or partial implicit
concession by one branch to the views of another that creates a judicial or extra-judicial
constitutional precedent. Id. at 997. As discussed infra Section II.C at notes 114–115 and
accompanying text, the nearly thirty years between a 1983 superior court ruling and the initial
McCleary ruling could be characterized as a period of such acquiescence.
9. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 519, 268 P.3d at 249 (asking whether the state, through the
Legislature, has “done enough”).
10. In game theory, Chicken provides each player with the highest payoff if it confronts while the
other avoids, but mutual confrontation results in the worst outcome for both. Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 8, at 1024.
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the Legislature to provide the Court with a specific, multi-year plan for
phasing in a constitutionally adequate system of school finance, and the
Legislature, though it has substantially increased11 school funding under
the statutory plan endorsed by the Court in its original ruling, has thrice
failed to provide the Court with a document dubbed a “plan.”12 So far,
the confrontation has escalated to an unprecedented13 judicial
declaration: the Legislature’s failure to legislate to the Court’s
satisfaction puts the State in contempt of Court.14 In August of 2015 the
Court sanctioned the State for this contempt by imposing a fine of
$100,000 per day.15 Looming ahead is the 2018 deadline, a due date
designated by the Legislature for specific statutory reforms and by the
Court for ultimate article IX compliance.
This Article is intended to bring a new institutional perspective to the
state constitutional dialogue on positive rights—a viewpoint from an
advocate for the branch that must enact the state’s policy and fiscal
11. 2015 REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT BY THE JOINT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ARTICLE IX LITIGATION 5–7 (July 27, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 REPORT],
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/2015%20Report.pdf
[https:// perma.cc/RBK7-9XJP] (2015–2017 state budget funding levels reflect a thirty-six percent
increase since the 2012 order criticizing lack of progress).
12. Order of August 13, 2015, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/843627_081315McC
learyorder.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN8K-6ZP7]; Order of Jan. 9, 2014, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477,
269 P.3d 227, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/
20140109_843627_McClearyOrder.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK3V-ZN8E]; Order of June 12, 2014,
McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/
supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_ShowCauseOrder_201406124.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Y3G-RM2Z]; Order of Dec. 20, 2012, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d
227, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20%20McCleary,%20et%20al.%20v.%20State%2012-20-12%20order%20with%20dissent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9XDA-2VX2].
13. The Court declared that “[w]e have no wish to be forced into . . . as some state high courts
have done, holding the legislature in contempt of court.” Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 8, McCleary, 173
Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. According to the Attorney General, research uncovered no other case
in which a state high court had held a state legislature in contempt. State of Washington’s Opening
Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 10, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_
OpeningBrief_20140711.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5VP-FGDM]; see also Kirk Johnson, Governor
Seeks New Taxes as a Court Order Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2015, at A13 (noting that legal
scholars could not remember another example of a state high court holding an equal branch of
government in contempt); cf. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 279–80 (1990) (indicating
that judicial enforcement of contempt sanctions directly upon a legislative body conflicts with
legislators’ First Amendment rights as well as common-law legislative immunity).
14. Order of Sept. 11, 2014, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20order
%20-%209-11-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2XG-ML5M].
15. Order of Aug. 13, 2015, at 9–10, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
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responses to judicial interpretations of the constitution.16 It will consider
a specific aspect of the McCleary showdown:17 positive rights
enforcement. Judicial enforcement of positive constitutional rights
qualitatively differs from other constitutional enforcement in its effect
on legislative policy-setting and the public fisc, but the Court has not
expressly declared any limitations on its authority to define the scope of
positive rights. This Article concludes that fiscal limits in the so-called
“disfavored constitution”18 establish separation of powers principles that
constrain the judiciary’s positive enforcement orders targeted at the
political branches.
Part I of this Article summarizes two distinctive aspects of state
constitutions. First, it discusses constitutional affirmative duty clauses
and associated scholarship which argues that these duties create
judicially enforceable positive rights. Second, it outlines fiscal restraints
in the so-called “disfavored constitution.” Commentators label these
obscure tax and expenditure restrictions “disfavored” not because they
are any less a part of state constitutions, but because courts and scholars
often deem them mere technicalities rather than statements of important
constitutional norms.19
Next, Part II discusses development of Washington’s positive
education right in the Seattle School District and McCleary rulings.
Then Part III briefly identifies unique separation of powers risks that
could arise from the McCleary Court’s enthusiastic embrace of positive
rights theories. Given the apparent absence of jurisprudential limits,
judicial enforcement of positive rights against the Legislature could
create an unquenchable public fiscal obligation—an obligation beyond
the control of legislators and the voters who elect them.
Part IV of this Article concludes that outer boundaries of judicial
authority to enforce positive constitutional rights are already found

16. Again, as previously noted, the author’s views are her own.
17. For additional background on McCleary, see Case Comment, Education Law—Washington
Supreme Court Holds Legislature in Contempt for Failing to Make Adequate Progress Toward
Remedying Unconstitutional Education Funding Scheme, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2048 (2015)
(discussing McCleary developments through contempt order); Jessica R. Burns, Comment, Public
School Funding and McCleary v. State of Washington—A Violation of the Separation of Powers
Doctrine or a Legitimate Exercise of Judicial Autonomy?, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1437 (2014);
Daniel C. Stallings, Comment, Washington State’s Duty to Fund K–12 Schools: Where the
Legislature Went Wrong and What It Should Do to Meet Its Constitutional Obligation, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 575 (2010).
18. Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional
Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 910 (2003).
19. See id.
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within the constitutional text—in the “disfavored constitution.” Part IV
argues that these fiscal controls are more than technical provisions—
rather, they are part of the electoral bargain, declaring affirmative
separation of powers principles designed to protect the people and their
relationship with the government to which they delegated political
power.20 Under the constitutional terms of this delegation, only the
people’s elected representatives have the authority to levy taxes21 and to
authorize the expenditure of the revenues thereby raised.22 The
disfavored constitution’s structural safeguards for the public fisc declare
principles that stand on equal footing with other constitutional
provisions. To the extent that Washington’s Constitution creates a
positive education right, then these equally mandatory constitutional
provisions counterbalance that right, requiring the Court to recognize
textual restraints on judicial enforcement of positive rights.
I.

POSITIVE DUTIES AND “DISFAVORED” FISCAL
RESTRAINTS ARE TWO DISTINCTIVE ASPECTS OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

A.

In State Constitutionalism, Textual Affirmative Duties Give Rise to
Positive Rights Theories

The renaissance in state constitutionalism that began in the 1970s
embraced many interrelated concepts of state constitutional
independence. Justice Brennan’s call to action in his influential 1977
article urged state courts to take a fresh, autonomous look at the way
state constitutions could provide greater protections for civil liberties,
ultimately resulting in the New Federalism movement.23 In a similar

20. “All political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.” WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 1.
21. “No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law; and every law imposing a tax shall state
distinctly the object of the same to which only it shall be applied.” WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
22. “No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or any of
the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law . . . . ” WASH.
CONST. art. VIII, § 4. Under article VII, section 6, all state tax revenues must be deposited in the
treasury. Ergo, state tax revenues may not be spent without an appropriation in law. See discussion
infra Section IV.A.2.
23. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977). See generally JAMES GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 24–25, 36–45 (2005); G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 161–70 (1998); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM 113–33 (2009).
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manner, after San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez24 rejected higherlevel scrutiny for state education rights under the federal Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause, 25 school advocates turned to state
constitutions’ equal protection clauses to find stronger safeguards for
educational equity, eventually persuading many state courts that the
education articles of state constitutions established substantive, judicially
enforceable duties to provide an adequately defined and funded
education.26 Finally, in a large body of academic commentary, scholars
called for state court judges to emerge from the shadow of federal
rationality review, recognize the inherent differences between state and
federal judicial powers, and interpret state constitutions to provide
“positive rights” to state taxpayer-funded services such as education,
welfare, and health care.27
1.

Within the Distinctive Structure of State Constitutions,
Constitutional Texts Contain Affirmative Duties

In an important contrast to federal constitutional content and
structure, state constitutions contain duty language that directs states to
enact specified types of laws or provide particular services.
The federal Constitution does not confer a positive right to state
government services.28 Instead, the federal Constitution is a “charter of

24. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
25. Id.
26. See generally Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robyn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in
Adequacy Litigation, 6 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 83, 90–95 (2010) (tracing history of “waves” in state
constitutional school funding litigation).
27. E.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990)
(discussing the federal Constitution); Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review
of Positive Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 1057 (1993); Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights and the Evolution of State
Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799 (2002) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Evolution]; Helen Hershkoff,
Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limitations of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1133 n.9 (1999) (citing authorities) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive Rights]; Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 1833 (2001) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Passive Virtues]; Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and
the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 890 (1989); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good
Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State
Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459 (2009). Contra Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights,
48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001). Positive rights scholarship specific to education rights also heavily
favors positive rights, with the counterarguments generally based in textualist or originalist
approaches. Scott R. Bauries, The Education Duty, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 723–26 (2012)
[hereinafter Bauries, Education Duty] (citing scholarship of Eastman and Dinan).
28. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (noting that
Fourteenth Amendment duties arise only where the state has first restrained an individual, which is
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negative liberties”29 or a “series of governmental ‘thou shalt nots,’”30
intended to shield individuals against government conduct without
obligating the government to provide any particular services or
protections to individuals.31 This characterization of the federal Bill of
Rights as a charter against government is confirmed by doctrinal
principles that limit federal courts’ ability to decide and enforce disputes
that focus on government’s resource allocation decisions.32
In contrast, a state constitution may establish a different, more
intimate relationship33 between the government and its citizens.
Structurally, state constitutions function as a limitation of the otherwise
plenary power of state legislatures, whose law-making power is
restricted only by the state and federal constitutions.34 Unlike Congress,
when enacting laws, state legislatures need not point to a textual grant of
power to legislate on a particular topic. Instead, they may pass any law
not constitutionally forbidden.
Even so, state constitutions frequently contain provisions authorizing,
exhorting, or even directing state legislatures to adopt laws on particular
topics.35 Education duty clauses are found in all state constitutions,36 and
state constitutions may also direct state governments to provide other

the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause); San Antonio, 411 U.S. 1 (holding education not a
fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally Usman, supra note 27, at 1460–
61.
29. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1989).
30. Neuborne, supra note 27, at 890.
31. E.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (noting the “Due Process Clauses generally confer no
affirmative right to governmental aid”).
32. See generally Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 27, at 1876–83 (discussing the federal
“case or controversy” requirement, political question doctrine, and other limitations).
33. Cf. Hershkoff, Evolution, supra note 27, at 802 (arguing for state constitutional amendments
“to create right of social citizenship that contemplates broad reciprocal bonds between the state and
the individual”).
34. See TARR, supra note 23, at 7–9; WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 249–54. Within this structure,
courts have nonetheless found inherent powers within the judicial branch. See In re Salary of
Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 245–46, 552 P.2d 163, 170–72 (1976) (listing “inherent” powers of
judiciary); see also discussion of Juvenile Director infra notes 225–228 and accompanying text;
WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 296 (explaining that claims of inherent powers in the respective
branches raise important but largely academic questions of political theory).
35. TARR, supra note 23, at 8–9; see also Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional
Tradition Revisited: Preliminary Observations on Constitution-Making in the American West, 25
RUTGERS L.J. 945, 967–71 (1994) (discussing “constitutional legislation” and the role of directory
clauses); John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the
Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 ALB. L. REV. 947 (2007) (classifying education clauses).
36. Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 n.5 (1991).
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public services, such as support for their poor.37 For example,
Washington’s Constitution contains not only an education duty, but also
a directive to “foster and support” institutions for the mentally ill,
developmentally disabled, and deaf, blind, or otherwise disabled youth.38
Given the structure of state constitutions, affirmative “duty” language
stands out, because directory provisions are “inherently contrary to the
concept of a state constitution.”39 State governments exercise all
governmental powers that remain after their constitutions’ restraints, so
it is “theoretically unnecessary to spell out such residual powers.”40
If these types of constitutional provisions are structurally superfluous,
then why might state constitutional drafters have included them? Some
drafters may have viewed them as policy statements not amenable to
judicial enforcement. Thomas Cooley, the godfather of late ninteenth
century state constitutionalism, generally cautioned against viewing
constitutional text as directory rather than mandatory, but he drew a
qualitative difference between self-executing provisions and “moral”
requirements addressed to the legislature.41 He explained that no
provision of a constitution is merely advisory, but some requirements are
“incapable of compulsory enforcement.”42 Although their “purpose may
be to establish rights or impose duties, they do not in and of themselves
constitute a sufficient rule by means of which such right may be
protected or such duty enforced.”43 For this reason, the provision may be
mandatory to the legislature, but “back of it there lies no authority to
37. E.g., Usman, supra note 27, at 1465–76 (listing possible types of positive rights).
38. See Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government: The
Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 872–76 (2000)
[hereinafter Talmadge, Property Absolutism] (listing constitutional duties of state government
intended to regulate social and commercial interaction of state and citizens).
39. Fritz, supra note 35, at 970–71.
40. Id.
41. THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 93 (5th ed. 1883) (discussing
mandatory versus directory); id. at 98–99 (noting where legislation is necessary to implement a
constitutional duty, the “requirement has only a moral force”). The treatise written by Judge Cooley,
one of the most influential constitutional authorities of his day, was well known to the Territorial
Supreme Court and in all likelihood known to the delegates of the Washington constitutional
convention. Territorial Justices John P. Hoyt and George Turner, who cited Cooley during their
tenure on the court, later served as delegates to the convention, with Hoyt elected president. See
Harland v. Territory, 3 Wash. Terr. 131, 145–46, 13 P. 453, 458 (1887) (citing COOLEY, supra);
Maynard v. Hill, 2 Wash. Terr. 321, 326, 5 P. 717, 718 (1884) (citing COOLEY, supra); Maynard v.
Valentine, 2 Wash. Terr. 3, 9, 3 P. 195, 196 (1880) (“Especially valuable we have found the
observations of . . . Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional Limitations.”). The author would
like to thank Pam Loginsky for calling this history to her attention.
42. COOLEY, supra note 41, at 98.
43. Id. at 99 (emphasis added).
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enforce the command.”44
Similarly, Theodore Stiles, a delegate to the Washington State
constitutional convention and later a Washington State Supreme Court
justice, opined a quarter-century after statehood that notwithstanding the
mandatory character of each clause, some of the constitution’s promising
provisions depend for operation upon action by the Legislature.45
Professor John Dinan, in his study of education clause debates at state
constitutional conventions, argues that these clauses include obligatory
language, but they “were not drafted for the purpose of enabling judicial
scrutiny of legislative judgments regarding school financing.”46
Alternatively, constitutional drafters, including those in the nineteenth
century West, might have intended to protect state legislation by
affirming, particularly against Lochner-esque challenges, that the
legislature had not only the power but an obligation to enact particular
policies.47
2.

Scholars Argue That Textual Affirmative Duties Give Rise to
Positive Constitutional Rights

In a large body of scholarship, commentators argue that state
constitutions include duty provisions for the express purpose of vesting
judicially enforceable positive constitutional rights in individuals.48 Just

44. Id. at 99; see also Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and Forms of Judicial Review, 82
TEX. L. REV. 1895, 1909 (2004) (noting alternate institutional mechanisms exist by which rights
may be enforced).
45. Theodore L. Stiles, The Constitution of the State and Its Effects Upon Public Interests, 4
WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 286 (1913). Seattle School District v. State used Stiles’ observation to confirm
the Legislature’s education funding failings. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 511, 585 P.2d 71 90, 91 (1978).
46. Dinan, supra note 35, at 949; see also John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil
Right? An Assessment of State Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 1 (1998) (describing originalist approach to education clause interpretation).
47. Fritz, supra note 35, at 970–71; see also TARR, supra note 23, at 8–9, (explaining that grants
of power may lead to negative implications); id. at 148–150 (Progressive-era constitutional duty
language); John Dinan, Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 983, 993 (2007) (noting state constitutional amendments to address Lochner);
Talmadge, Property Absolutism, supra note 38, at 872–76 (listing constitutional duties of state
government intended to regulate social and commercial interaction of state and citizens). But cf.
JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 123–30 (2006) (explaining
that constitutional efforts to address Lochner took the form of efforts to limit judicial review).
48. See, e.g., Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1138; Usman, supra note 27, at 1464–
76; see also supra note 26 (citing authorities); cf. TARR, supra note 23, at 147–50 (describing use of
state constitutions to address positive rights and economic well-being). “While there is no apparent
societal move toward recognizing positive constitutional rights, law reviews seem overwhelmingly
in favor of such recognition.” Cross, supra note 27 at 859, 860 n.12 (citing Hershkoff, Positive
Rights, supra note 27, at 1133 n.9). Needless to say, legal scholars are not in the business of
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as the New Federalism movement encouraged state courts to step out
from the shadow of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting civil
liberties protections, positive rights advocates comprehensively argue
that fundamental differences between state and federal constitutions
justify judicial recognition and enforcement of positive state
constitutional rights.49
To demonstrate that constitutional affirmative duties establish
corresponding positive rights, theorists have cited the writings of legal
philosopher Wesley Hohfeld.50 Hohfeld is best known for developing an
analytical framework to explain legal rights, a structure that
characterizes “rights” based on different types of paired relationships.51
In a Hohfeldian analysis, an affirmative duty to provide necessarily
correlates to an affirmative right to receive—the Hohfeldian binary
framework cannot conceive of a duty without such a corresponding
right.52 For that reason, positive rights scholarship argues that
constitutional “duty” language must create corresponding positive rights.
What, then, is a positive constitutional right, and how does it differ
from a “negative” right?
The distinction between positive and negative rights is an
intuitive one: One category is a right to be free from
government, while the other is a right to command government
action. A positive right is a claim to something . . . while a
negative right is a right that something not be done to one.53
Stated differently, “if there was no government in existence, would the
right be automatically fulfilled?”54 Admittedly, if there is no
government, there are no “legal” rights, a status potentially characterized
as “[s]tatelessness spells rightlessness.”55 But the absence of a state

balancing state budgets.
49. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1170–91; see also Hershkoff, Passive Virtues,
supra note 27 at 1888–90.
50. Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights: Conceptual Convergence in
School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 304–10 (2011) [hereinafter Bauries,
Conceptual Convergence]; see also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30–31 (1913).
51. See Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 306–26 (summarizing Hohfeld’s
rights in the context of school finance litigation).
52. Id. at 316 (“None of the other Hohfeldian relationships map cleanly on the right to receive an
entitled action, service, or set of resources.”).
53. Cross, supra note 27, at 864. This definition is suggested by Professor Cross, a rare positive
rights skeptic.
54. Id. at 866.
55. Id. (citing STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 19 (1999)).
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means that one is by definition free from intrusive state action “done to
one.”
Rights established by the federal Constitution are negative in nature.
True, federal constitutional rights frequently require the state to provide
publicly funded services to individuals56—services that could be
characterized as “a claim to something.” For example, the federal
Constitution requires states to provide counsel to the accused,57 adequate
facilities for prisoners,58 and “minimally adequate care and treatment”
for involuntarily confined persons such as those with mental illness.59
However, federal constitutional rights are not truly positive rights,
because the state’s constitutional duty is predicated on the initial state
action “done to” the individual. If the state declines to undertake the
initial state action, it may avoid the duty to provide the associated
services.
In contrast, positive rights impose a qualitatively different type of
duty on government: “Positive rights do not restrain government action:
they require it.”60 If a constitutional affirmative duty creates a
corresponding positive right, such as education or subsistence, only the
government can fulfill the right, and it must do so. Without regard to any
legislation or state-initiated action, the mere presence within the state of
an individual who possesses a positive constitutional right triggers a
state duty to provide publicly funded services. Simply put, in positive
rights advocacy such a right imposes an unavoidable duty on the state
and its taxpayers to support the program as mandated and defined by the
judicial interpretation of the constitution.
B.

The “Disfavored Constitution” Establishes Taxpayer Protections
in the Form of Fiscal Restrictions on the State

Just as positive duties are distinctive characteristics of state
constitutions, so are fiscal restraints.61 In another form of contrast to the
federal Constitution, state constitutions consistently give extensive
consideration to state and local taxing, spending, and borrowing. These
public fiscal controls “seek to protect taxpayers by limiting the activities

56. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1896 (noting budget implications).
57. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
59. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
60. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 519 269 P.3d 227, 248 (2012) (citing Hershkoff,
Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1137).
61. Briffault, supra note 18, at 908.
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and costs of government.”62
Commentators use the term “disfavored constitution”63 to describe
fiscal restrictions not because these provisions are any less a part of state
constitutions, but because they are a distinctly un-sexy aspect of state
constitutionalism, especially when compared to the civil liberties of the
New Federalism or the state-funded services of positive rights
scholarship. The disfavored constitution is of little interest to academics
and advocates, and of far more interest to the practitioners who facilitate
the day-to-day operations of state governments.
Further, fiscal limits are also disfavored by courts, which often read
them as mere technical provisions rather than as statements of important
constitutional norms.64
First, courts tend to treat fiscal limits not as issues of
fundamental rights—like speech, religion, or privacy—or as
matters fundamental to government structure—like separation of
powers, bicameralism, or federalism—but rather as ordinary
legislation. . . . Second, the state courts often appear quite
sympathetic to the goals of the programs that would be curbed
by the fiscal limits.65
As set forth in more detail at infra Section IV.A, by reserving taxing
and spending authorities to the legislative branch, the fiscal restrictions
of the disfavored constitution also operate as separation of powers
requirements.
II.

THE BASIS FOR A POSITIVE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN
THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION
The “paramount duty” clause of the Washington Constitution’s

62. Id. at 908; see also TARR, supra note 23, at 21 (explaining that finance and taxation
provisions are common features of state constitutions); WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 28 (state
constitutions contain long articles on taxation and finance, “two of the most important functions of
any government”); cf. James Gray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 985, 985 (1993) (state constitutional text “obsesses in excruciating detail over
pecuniary matters”).
63. Briffault, supra note 18, at 910.
64. Id. at 910.
65. Id. at 939–41. Regarding the latter point, Briffault’s characterization of judicial sympathy
applies specifically in the context of fiscal limits that attempt to restrict financial projects of the
“modern activist state”—roads, convention centers, etc., and of the risks of too much judicial
deference to the political branches, rather than not enough. But his point applies either way—
whether potential infringement comes from the legislature or from the courts, fiscal restrictions in
state constitutions are meaningful expressions of the relationship that the voters intended to have
among themselves, their elected representatives, and the public fisc.
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education article has resulted in two remarkable decisions from the
Washington State Supreme Court. In Seattle School District and
McCleary, the Court has twice ruled that article IX, section 1 imposes an
affirmative duty on the State that creates its Hohfeldian “jural
correlative”—a positive right on the part of the state’s children to have
the State define and amply fund a program of basic education. McCleary
took a further step by retaining jurisdiction over the case to monitor
legislative implementation, culminating in an unprecedented contempt
ruling against the State over the Legislature’s failure to legislate to the
Court’s satisfaction.
A.

Washington’s Unique Education Clause Declares a “Paramount
Duty”

Affirmatively stated66 education clauses are consistent features of
state constitutions, appearing in the constitutional texts of all fifty
states.67 But article IX, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution
contains singular terminology68: “It is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color,
caste, or sex.”69
Washington’s Constitution is unique in declaring that “ample
provision” for education is “the paramount duty of the state.”70 In textual
66. Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 27, at 719.
67. McUsic, supra note 36, at 311 n.5.
68. Recent constitutional amendments and new constitutions contain comparatively strong
education language. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (amended 2002) (“a paramount duty to make
adequate provision” (emphasis added)); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (amended 1983) (“a primary
obligation” to make adequate provision (emphasis added)); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (amended 1970)
(educational development a “fundamental goal”; state must provide a “high quality” education).
None of these states finds a positive right to education. See infra note 76 (citing cases).
69. Washington’s historical record offers no insight into why the framers of our constitution
included this extraordinary clause. The working draft constitution proposed to the delegates by W.
Lair Hill recommended a “thorough and efficient” schools clause based on the 1870 constitution of
Illinois. W. LAIR HILL, A CONSTITUTION ADAPTED TO THE COMING STATE 64 (1889)
http://lib.law.washington.edu/waconst/Sources/Hill%20Constitution.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7D9RHBFB]; see JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1889, at v-vi
(1999) [hereinafter JOURNAL] (mentioning the influence of Hill’s constitutional draft); ILL. CONST.
of 1870 art. VIII, § 1. The “paramount duty” clause inspired no debate, and discussion of the
educational article at the constitutional convention focused on the need to protect the federal
educational endowment from mismanagement. JOURNAL, supra, at 276–78, 685–88. See generally
L.K. Beale, Comment, Charter Schools, Common Schools & the Washington State Constitution, 72
WASH. L. REV. 535 (1997) (describing history of schools in Washington).
70. Compare WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (emphasis added), with supra note 68 (providing other
high-duty text examples).
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analyses that rank the verbal intensity of states’ education finance
clauses, commentators classify Washington’s text as a “silver bullet,”71
or “high duty,”72 and they place the Washington State Supreme Court as
among “the most liberal leaning courts” on this issue.”73
State constitutional education clauses have resulted in “waves” of
litigation.74 Notably, litigation outcomes in the various states do not
necessarily correlate with the verbal strength of the respective
constitutional texts.75 Courts in states with “high duty” clauses have
refused to find fundamental or otherwise judicially enforceable rights,
while states with mild, generic language have experienced active judicial
enforcement of education clauses.76
In Washington’s education jurisprudence, however, an exceptional
text receives an exceptional interpretation. Seattle School District is a
“third wave” decision—one based on arguments that the constitutional
language imposes a substantive standard for education quality and
funding. McCleary is a “fourth wave” ruling—one in which advocates
sought to re-litigate previous victories after perceived state regression.77

71. Willam S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Reexamination of the
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185,
1245 (2003).
72. William E. Thro, School Finance Reform, A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis
in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525, 540 n.40 (1998); Dinan, supra note 35, at 929
n.13.
73. Amanda Marra, State Constitutional Law—Thorough and Efficient Education—The Right to a
Thorough and Efficient System of Education Trumps the Power of the Appropriations Clause in
New Jersey, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 771, 795 (2013). These “liberal” courts are more likely to be found in
liberal states. Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 716–17
[hereinafter Bauries, Judicial Review] (describing political factors associated with education
litigation outcomes).
74. For discussion of the various waves, see generally Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 27, at
726–30; Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 26, at 89–95.
75. Dinan, supra note 35, at 929–30 (“[D]isembodied parsing of constitutional terminology may
be of limited or no value.”); Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 712–15 (surveying studies;
no clear relation between constitutional language and outcome).
76. Thro, supra note 72, at 541; see also supra note 68 (providing constitutional texts); McDaniel
v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981) (holding textual “primary obligation” did not oblige the State
to equalize opportunities between districts); Blasé v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 49 (Ill. 1973) (declaring
that 1970 clause states a purpose or goal, not a legislative obligation). Arguably, it is harmful to
state constitutionalism that so many state judicial rulings distill diverse education texts into a
homogenized educational right. Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to
Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949, 988 (2014) [hereinafter Bauries, Right to Education]; Bauries,
Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 303–04.
77. See generally Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 26, at 84–86 (discussing recent failed
lawsuits, including first-impression and second-round adequacy cases, in 2005–2008).
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Although these last-wave lawsuits have generally failed to persuade state
high courts that judicial intervention is required or appropriate,78
Washington, as always, is a special case. In both rulings, the Washington
State Supreme Court used the power of judicial interpretation to find that
Washington’s unique text creates a positive right vested in the state’s
schoolchildren.
B.

Seattle School District: Article IX Creates a True, Absolute Right

Although McCleary’s 2012 positive rights ruling triggered an
unprecedented confrontation between the state Legislature and judiciary,
the holding did not spring forth fully armed from the Court’s collective
brow. On the contrary, McCleary is entirely rooted in its 1978
predecessor, Seattle School District, differing primarily in its express
embrace of positive rights scholarship and then in its subsequent judicial
enforcement.79
The landmark Seattle School District case held that the “paramount
duty” clause of article IX, section 1 establishes a mandate on the State
that requires, as a first priority, fully sufficient funds for a “general and
uniform system of public schools.”80 This right is unique in the nation.81
The Washington State Supreme Court was the first state high court to
address educational adequacy in the absolute sense, and the Seattle
School District opinion is “the most lengthy and comprehensive analysis
of the question of state constitutional education rights found among all

78. In most cases, these last-wave suits have failed to persuade state high courts that judicial
intervention is required or appropriate. Id., supra note 26, at 84–86 (citing cases from
Massachusetts, Kentucky, New York, South Carolina, Arizona, Alaska, and Nebraska). More recent
examples include Dwyer v. State, 357 P. 3d 185, 193 (Colo. 2015) (holding that state cuts to school
funding did not violate constitutional education funding requirements), Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d
1132, 1137 (Colo. 2013) (holding that funding formulae were valid as “rationally related” to
constitutional objective), and Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 2011) (rejecting claim due to
failure of proof). Contra Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014) (still pending amidst multiple
appeals and remands); Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 2011). Abbott is discussed in Marra,
supra note 73.
79. For a discussion of the legal developments that culminated in the Seattle School District
ruling, see Koski, supra note 71, at 1245–49. See also Northshore Sch. Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wash.
2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) (rejecting an earlier article IX challenge).
80. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P.2d 71 90, 95 (1978).
81. See Bauries, Education Duty, supra note 27, at 723–24 (noting only Washington has taken
correlativity analysis this far); Bauries, Right to Education, supra note 76, at 999 n.224 (noting only
the Washington State Supreme Court has ventured into Hohfeldian analysis). But see Bauries,
Education Duty, supra note 27, 66at 737–39 (characterizing Seattle School District as finding
legislative duty and not positive individual entitlement).
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school finance cases.”82
In Seattle School District, the Court began by emphasizing the
judicial branch’s primacy in constitutional interpretation, citing Marbury
v. Madison’s83 axiom that it “is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is.”84 Anticipating arguments
that the constitution vests policy and fiscal powers in the democratically
elected branches, making the matter a political question, the Court
explained that once the Court determines that the dispute requires
constitutional interpretation, there is no separation of powers issue, and
“the matter is strictly one of judicial discretion.”85
Having resolved the primacy issue, the Washington State Supreme
Court then turned its interpretive focus to the precise text of article IX,
section 1. Seattle School District used the Court’s power of
interpretation to transform a single word of constitutional text into an
expansive, paragraphs-long meditation about the role of public
education. The constitutional term “education” embraces far more than
“mere reading, writing and arithmetic.” Instead, the Court declared that
the State must prepare its children to participate in both the political and
economic marketplaces—otherwise, the right to an amply funded
education “would be hollow indeed.”86
Next, the Court considered the term “paramount.” The “framers
declared only once in the entire document that a specified function was
the State’s paramount duty,” and nothing shows that article IX, section 1
was a mere preamble87 or otherwise had secondary status.88 The Journal
does not show any intent that the clause is a mere preamble because the
Journal does not say anything about the paramount duty clause. The
delegates’ reasons for borrowing the clause from the 1868 Florida

82. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 338–39.
83. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
84. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 496, 585 P.2d at 83 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176)).
85. Id. at 504–05, 585 P.2d at 88 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). In other
words, in a separation of powers dispute involving the judicial branch, judicial interpretational
authority means that the branch whose actions are alleged to breach separation of powers has the
authority to decide whether its actions in fact have that effect.
86. Id. at 517–18, 585 P.2d at 94.
87. Notwithstanding the caption “preamble” on article IX, section 1, under article I, section 29,
all provisions of the Washington Constitution are mandatory. Id. at 500, 585 P.2d at 85. The original
constitution did not contain part or section headers, so nothing in its text designated article IX,
section 1 as a preamble. Id. at 499, 585 P.2d at 85.
88. Id. at 510, 585 P.2d at 91.
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Constitution are not stated in the Journal.89 Further, by definition, only
one function may be “paramount,” so it is not surprising that the framers
used the term only once.
To conclude that article IX, section 1 created a “social, economic and
educational duty as distinguished from a mere policy or moral
obligation,” the Seattle School District Court again cited the
observations of Theodore Stiles: “No other state has placed the common
school on so high a pedestal.”90 However, the Court did not analyze
Stiles’ full statement, which optimistically expresses the view that
federally granted state school lands would be sold to provide the
Permanent Common School Fund with an irreducible endowment “of
$25,000,000, an endowment greater than that of any other educational
system now existing.”91 The delegates’ lofty goals for the Permanent
Fund collapse when faced with modern K-12 funding demands: in the
2013–2015 biennium, revenue sources related to the endowment equal
about one percent of total state K-12 operating appropriations.92
89. JOURNAL, supra note 69, at 685–91 (discussing education article). Due to a shortfall in the
congressional appropriation for the convention, the shorthand notes were never transcribed, so the
Journal contains only an abstract of motions and votes. Id. at vi–vii.
90. Seattle School District, 90 Wash. 2d at 510–11, 585 P.2d at 90–91 (citing Stiles, supra note
45, at 284).
91. Stiles, supra note 45, at 284; see WASH. CONST. of 1889 art. IX, § 3. Stiles may have based
his expectation of a generous school endowment on a belief that after statehood not only would the
state sell the federally granted state-owned lands, but the federal government would also sell
federally owned lands within the state. Per the Enabling Act, the state receives five percent of
federal sale proceeds. See Donald J. Kochan, Public Lands and the Federal Government’s
Compact-Based “Duty to Dispose”: A Case Study of Utah’s H.B. 148—The Transfer of Public
Lands Act, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1133 (arguing framers of western state constitutions understood
enabling legislation as federal government’s promise to sell federal lands after statehood).
92. A comparison of revenues related to the statehood-era land endowment and state expenditures
for K-12 shows that the former is only about 1.1% of the latter. There are two main types of state
revenues attributable to the federal land endowment: timber revenues from state school lands and
interest earnings of the Permanent Common School Fund. WASH. CONST. art. IX § 3, amended by
WASH. CONST. amend XLIII; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.515 (2014 & Supp. 2015). Under
Amendment 43, which was ratified in 1966, both types of revenue are deposited in the Common
School Construction Fund (CSCF), from which they may be appropriated only for common school
construction. The CSCF also receives rental and other earnings, which are likewise restricted.
WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.515.320 (2014 & Supp. 2015). At statehood, only interest and rental
earnings would have been available for appropriation to schools, because timber revenues were
deposited in the principal of the Permanent Common School Fund (then designated the “Common
School Fund”). WASH. CONST. of 1889 art. IX, § 3.
Even though the endowment-related revenues now may be used only for school
construction and not school operations, a comparison of those revenues to state expenditures for
school operations shows how modern school funding requirements vastly exceed the endowment
revenues on which the delegates might have relied. (The present calculation is based on actual
CSCF revenues and state NGFS + Op expenditures for the 2013–2015 biennium, because full
revenue estimates for the 2015-2017 biennium are not published yet.) Specifically, in the 2013–
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But most significantly, the Seattle School District Court considered
the constitutional term “duty,” and it used the judiciary’s interpretational
authority to turn the lead of duty into the gold of a true or absolute right.
By imposing a paramount duty, the constitution simultaneously
established that duty’s “jural correlative,” a corresponding paramount
right on the part of the state’s children to have the State make ample
provision for their education. 93
In a lengthy and abstract footnote, the Court relied on Hohfeld to
explain the theoretical basis of this “jural correlative” right.94 The Court
embraced Hohfeld’s distinction between “absolute” rights, which
correspond only to an unavoidable duty, and other so-called rights,
which are really liberties or immunities that may be impaired upon a
judicially cognizable reason.95 Most significantly, the Court explained
that the right corresponding to the paramount duty clause is a “true
‘right’ (or absolute).”96
The Court’s theory-dense justification demonstrates an independent
state constitutionalism struggling to emerge from the strictures of
constitutional interpretation based on federal Fourteenth Amendment
terminology.97 The discussion repudiates the idea that state constitutional
2015 fiscal biennium, the Permanent Common School Fund earned $16.9 million in interest; this
amount is deposited into the CSCF. Estimated and Actual State Revenue Source Reports, WASH. ST.
REVENUE, http://fiscal.wa.gov/Revenue.aspx [https:// perma.cc/3ULM-RXDG ] (last visited Jan. 19,
2016) (select dropdown menu next to “Biennium” and select “2013-15 Biennium,” select dropdown
menu next to “List” and select “Common School Construction Account,” select “View Report” to
retrieve the data, click the plus sign next to “Public Schools,” click the plus sign next to “Special
Appropriations” to open all the data). In 2013–2015, revenues to the CSCF from timber, rentals, and
other sources totaled $156.6 million. Id. Total CSCF revenues for 2013–2015 were thus $173.4
million. Id. (the data at fiscal.wa.gov treat debt service payable from the CSCF as a revenue
reduction rather than an expenditure, so for purposes of this analysis the amount attributable to debt
service payments is added back in as revenue. Id.) In contrast, the state’s total actual NGFS + Op
expenditures for K-12 in the 2013–2015 biennium were $15.3 billion. 2015 REPORT, supra note 11,
at 7, 38–39. This means that that in 2013–2015, CSCF revenues equal 1.1% of state K-12 operating
expenditures. In the 2015–2017 biennium, due to the significant increase in state K-12 spending, see
supra note 11, this percentage is likely to be even smaller.
93. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash.2d at 511–12, 585 P.2d at 91.
94. Id. at 513 n.13, 585 P.2d at 93 n.13 (citing WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 47 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1964); see also
Hohfeld, supra note 50, at 30–31.
95. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 513 n.13, 585 P.2d at 93 n.13.
96. Id.
97. This reasoning represents an early version of Hershkoff’s rejection of the limits of rationality
review. See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1153–56. Much of this portion of Seattle
School District is drawn from Justice Stafford’s dissent in the failed 1974 article IX case Northshore
School District v. Kinnear, which expressly argued against borrowing federal rationality
terminology and in favor of analysis based solely on the state constitution. 84 Wash. 2d 685, 752–
56, 530 P.2d 178, 214–17 (1974) (Stafford, J., dissenting).
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analysis should replicate the sliding federal scale, “sizing constitutional
rights like eggs and governmental interests like olives, from medium to
jumbo.”98 In so doing, the Court correctly focused on the state text rather
than importing federal rationality analysis.
But, having appropriately turned to the state text, the Court then failed
to appropriately scrutinize its wording.99 Rather than analyzing the
meaning of the term “duty” in light of the constitutional text, structure,
and history, the Court instead focused on “paramount,” borrowing
Hohfeld’s abstractions to find a positive legal right in a text that declares
only a duty. It is hard to say whether this is the result of too much
judicial imagination, by assuming that Hohfeld’s analysis could be
applied to state constitutional interpretation, or too little, by failing to
recognize that there are more things in state constitutions than are
dreamt of in Hohfeld’s binary philosophy.100 The Court did not consider
whether constitutional drafters may have intended to create affirmative
state duties without creating corresponding Hohfeldian claim-rights.101
Because Holfeldian analysis assumes that “rights” are judicially
enforceable, it obscures the possibility of other constitutional
mechanisms (such as legislative action) to satisfy the affirmative duty.102
Particularly when considered in light of Cooley’s cautions about duties
that may be given meaning only by the Legislature,103 only through the
alchemy of judicial interpretation does the framers’ textual choice to
establish a duty, even a paramount duty, create the “jural correlative” of
a personal “absolute” right.
Having transmuted a duty into a right, the Court explained that it, not
the Legislature, has the final word on interpreting the scope—and
consequently the cost—of the right’s implementation. Again, the Court
relied on Marbury and judicial primacy in constitutional
98. Hans Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed
Discourse, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 953 (1993).
99. Cf. Malyon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 799 n.31, 935 P.2d 1272, 1281 n.31 (1997)
(“Appropriate constitutional analysis begins with the text and, for most purposes, should end there
as well.”).
100. See Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1909 (noting constitutional rights may be enforced by nonjudicial means). Hohfeld’s framework was developed for private law, but constitutional law does
not necessarily involve the simple, dualistic relationship structure of common-law relations such as
torts or contracts. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 309.
101. Bauries, Conceptual Convergence, supra note 50, at 325 (concluding education duties may
be read to create such rights, but the conclusion is not inevitable); see also Dinan, supra note 35,
939; Eastman, supra note 46 (discussing originalist approach to education clause interpretation).
102. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1909.
103. See COOLEY, supra note 41; see also infra Section III.B.2 (discussing separation of powers
risks of enforcing undefined provisions).
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interpretation.104 It conceded that the administrative and organizational
details of the public schools fall within the Legislature’s province under
the “general and uniform” clause’s express vesting of that authority in
the legislative branch, but ultimately the Court, as arbiter of
constitutional meaning, determines whether the Legislature has acted
pursuant to the article IX, and whether it has done so constitutionally.105
Notwithstanding the breadth of the rights the majority had found in
the constitutional text, the Seattle School District Court engaged in
“remedial abstention,”106 stopping short of ordering the Legislature to
enact any particular scheme of funding legislation. The Court had “great
faith” in the Legislature’s ability to define and fund a program of basic
education.107 Not only did it give the State additional time to come into
compliance, but it expressly declined to retain jurisdiction over the case,
making this one of the few points on which the high Court overruled the
well-regarded trial court decision. According to Seattle School District,
retained jurisdiction was “inconsistent with the assumption that the
legislature will comply with the judgment and its constitutional
duties.”108
Notably, Justice Utter declined to sign on to the full scope of the
Court’s rights analysis. Though he agreed with the majority that article
IX, section 1 “guarantees a right of education to the state’s children,” he
would have invalidated the system of local levy financing without going
on to hold that the constitution mandates provision of a “specific ‘basic
education.’”109 Turning the meaning of “education” into constitutional
doctrine “deprives the people of this state of a continuing legislative and
political dialogue on what constitutes a proper education.”110 Because
the Legislature had acted “responsibly and exhaustively through its own
uniquely constituted fact-finding and opinion-gathering processes,” he
urged restraint and a limited holding.111

104. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496–97, 502–07, 585 P.2d 71, 83–84, 86–89
(1978).
105. Id. at 518, 585 P.2d at 95.
106. Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 724–25 (maintaining judicial legitimacy by
adjudicating merits but avoiding injunctive remedial orders).
107. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 537, 585 P.2d at 104.
108. Id. at 538, 585 P.2d at 105.
109. Id. at 546–47, 585 P.2d at 109 (Utter, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 547, 585 P.2d at 109.
111. Id. at 551, 585 P.2d at 112.
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McCleary: A Generation Later, the Positive Right Is Reaffirmed
and Expanded

Even before the Seattle School District Court ruled on appeal in 1978,
the Legislature had responded to the January 1977 trial court ruling112
with comprehensive school funding legislation.113 This proof of
constitutional good faith, together with the Washington State Supreme
Court’s refusal to oversee the legislative process, allowed the Legislature
and the Court to reach a détente of “ambiguous acquiescence”114 for the
next thirty-plus years.115 In the intervening period, the Legislature
engaged in a large number of studies and enacted various education
reforms,116 and the Court ruled on challenges to specific aspects of
school funding,117 but in none of these cases was the Court required to
re-analyze Seattle School District’s “true” or “absolute” right to
education.118
Filed on January 11, 2007, almost forty years to the day after the trial
court ruling in Seattle School District, the McCleary suit asked the court
to revisit the positive rights it had recognized in the earlier leading
case.119 As McCleary moved toward trial, the Legislature continued to
study proposals for school funding reform through the 2007–2008 work
of the Basic Education Finance Task Force. In 2009, before the
112. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 53950 (Thurston Cty. Super. Ct. Jan 14, 1977).
113. 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1606.
114. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 1017 (“[A]mbiguous acquiescence reflects a point
midway between the extremes of showdown and acquiescence.”).
115. A short confrontation occurred in the recession of the early 1980s, in which legislative
budget cuts resulted in subsequent legislative acquiescence to their prohibition in Judge Doran’s
1983 ruling known as Seattle School District II. See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 489–90,
540–41, 269 P.3d 227, 234, 258–59 (2012) (discussing Seattle School District II facts and trial court
ruling).
116. See id. at 490–501, 269 P.3d 234–41 (summarizing studies and legislation).
117. Sch. Dist. Alliance v. State, 170 Wash. 2d 599, 244 P.3d 1 (2010) (rejecting claim that
special education funding formula violated constitution); Fed. Way Sch. Dist. v. State, 167 Wash.
2d 514, 219 P.3d 941 (2009) (holding variations in “minutiae” of funding formulas did not conflict
with “general and uniform” requirement); Brown v. State, 155 Wash. 2d 254, 119 P.3d 341 (2005)
(deciding reduction in funding on statutory grounds); McGowan v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 293–
94, 60 P.3d 67, 74–75 (2002) (invalidating declaration that salary increases for teachers outside the
basic education program were part of the state’s article IX obligation); Tunstall v. State, 141 Wash.
2d 201, 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (holding the State satisfied duty to provide education to youth in
Department of Corrections facilities).
118. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 511–13, 513 n.13, 585 P.2d 71, 91–93, 92 n.13
(1978).
119. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 SEA (King Cty.
Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2007); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, No. 53950 (Thurston Cty. Super. Ct.
Jan 14, 1977).
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McCleary trial court’s ruling, the Legislature enacted ESHB 2261,
which among other reforms included a framework for substantial
revision of the state’s K-12 funding methodology.120 The following year,
in SHB 2776, the Legislature provided details for the new formula,
revising foundational state allocations under a new “prototypical school”
model and specifying a phase-in schedule for particular new
enhancements to the funding formula, such as all-day kindergarten and
class size reductions in grades K-3, with final implementation of these
reforms due in 2018.121 The new funding formulas took effect in 2011,
during the depths of the Great Recession, and the 2011–2013 budget
made only slight progress toward funding the new formula
enhancements.122 Going into the 2012 legislative session, the state fiscal
condition was so dire that Governor Christine Gregoire’s proposed
supplemental budget recommended cutting four days from the 180-day
state-funded school year.123 On January 5, 2012, a month after the close
of a special legislative session to enact further budget cuts and just days
before the opening of the 2012 regular legislative session, the
Washington State Supreme Court published its McCleary ruling.124
Written by Justice Stephens on behalf of a unanimous Court,125
McCleary reaffirmed and expanded upon two key aspects of Seattle
School District. First, the Court underscored its earlier ruling on the
primacy of the judicial branch in constitutional interpretation. In a brief
concession, the Court acknowledged Justice Utter’s reminder that the
Legislature’s “uniquely constituted fact-finding and opinion gathering
processes provide the best forum” for determining the particulars of
education funding formulas.126 For that reason, the Court declared it will
not specify the details of staffing ratios, salaries, and similar costs, but it
120. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1860 (SHB 2776); 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331 (ESHB 2261); see
infra note 152 (explaining due dates in legislation).
121. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws 1860.
122. See REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT BY THE JOINT SELECT
COMMITTEEE ON ARTICLE IX LITIGATION 24–28 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 REPORT] (describing
budget situation, state K-12 expenditures).
123. See id. at 29.
124. The decision was published on January 5th. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d
227 (2012). Regular sessions of the legislature begin on the second Monday in January. WASH.
REV. CODE § 44.04.010 (2015).
125. Justices Madsen and James Johnson dissented on the decision to retain jurisdiction.
McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 547–48, 269 P.3d at 262–63 (Madsen, J., dissenting in part) (arguing
that lack of ascertainable standards, as well as deference to legislative function, weigh against
retaining jurisdiction).
126. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 517, 269 P.3d at 247 (majority opinion) (citing Seattle Sch. Dist.
v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 551, 585 P.2d at 71 (Utter, J., concurring)).
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held the judiciary retains full authority to interpret the constitutional
term “education” by providing broad guidelines and by testing
legislative enactments against those judicially defined standards.127
The second aspect of Seattle School District on which McCleary
elaborated is the “relationship between the State’s obligation to provide
an education and the corresponding right of Washington children to
receive an education.”128 Expanding on Seattle School District’s Hohfeld
footnote and citing to leading positive rights scholarship, Justice
Stephens concluded that positive rights demand that the Court view the
constitution in a qualitatively different light. The distinction between
positive and negative constitutional rights is significant, she explained,
because in a negative rights analysis, the judicial inquiry is whether the
legislative or executive branches have overstepped constitutional
restraints.129 In contrast, “[p]ositive constitutional rights do not restrain
government action: they require it.”130 For this reason, when confronted
with a positive rights claim, the Court must use a judicial test more
stringent than a mere rational basis review: the Court asks whether the
State has “done enough”—“whether the state action achieves or is
reasonably likely to achieve the constitutionally prescribed end.”131
Applying this new higher standard, the Court invalidated the
Legislature’s K-12 funding formulas. In rejecting the state’s former132
funding scheme, McCleary explained that those formulas generated
insufficient state funding, so the resulting state allocations failed to align
with district costs of implementing the state’s program, thereby forcing
school districts to depend on local levies to support the basic education
program.133 Reliance on levies to support the cost of the state’s program
was a shortfall directly in conflict with Seattle School District’s
prohibition on using levies for basic education.134 Ultimately the Court
concluded that “[s]ubstantial evidence confirms that the state’s funding
system neither achieved nor was reasonably likely to achieve the

127. Id. at 516–19, 269 P.3d at 246–48.
128. Id. at 518, 269 P.3d at 247 (emphasis in original).
129. Id. at 519, 269 P.3d at 248 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Due to the timing of their enactment in 2009 and 2010 respectively, the funding reforms of
ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776 were not squarely before the court, so the court invalidated the state’s
prior funding formulas.
133. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 532–39, 269 P.3d at 254–58.
134. Id. at 539, 269 P.3d at 258.
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constitutionally prescribed ends under Article IX, section 1.”135
D.

Judicial Oversight in McCleary: Deference Followed by Demands

In contrast to the Seattle School District Court, the McCleary Court
chose to retain jurisdiction over the case. The Court declared that it had
the “benefit of seeing the wheels turn” under the funding reforms of
ESHB 2261.136 But, given the scant progress toward implementation of
these reforms in the 2011–2013 budget, the “court cannot idly stand by
as the legislature makes unfulfilled promises for reform.”137
Notwithstanding the Court’s sweeping statements about positive
rights and judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation, and
notwithstanding the rather perfunctory nods toward the legislative role,
the initial McCleary ruling contains a pattern of subtle deference to the
legislative scheme.
First, in defining the education right, the Court established one
safeguard against an unlimited state obligation by rejecting an individual
right to a particular educational outcome. It is an “inescapable truth that
certain factors critical to a student’s achievement are simply outside the
state’s control.”138 For that reason, article IX required the State to
provide an opportunity to obtain the education described by the Court
and in statute, but the positive right does not include a right to a
guaranteed educational outcome.139
Next, the Court endorsed the Legislature’s enactment of ESHB 2261,
indicating that its “promising reform package” would, “if fully
funded, . . . remedy deficiencies in the K-12 funding system.”140 In other
words, the Court’s initially chosen remedy was implementation of the
plan already adopted by the Legislature.141 Similarly, the compliance
135. Id.
136. Id. at 543, 269 P.3d at 260.
137. Id. at 543, 545, 269 P.3d at 260, 261.
138. Id. at 525, 269 P.3d at 251.
139. Id. at 525–26, 269 P.3d at 251; see also Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 236, 5 P.3d
691, 709–10 (2000) (Talmadge, J., concurring) (“Individual children, their parents, and local school
districts each have standing to compel the Legislature to implement this constitutional mandate. But
the courts cannot prescribe an individual right to a specific form of education.”). Compare id., with
Bauries, Right to Education, supra note 76, at 995–1006 (arguing for constitutional education right
to develop through “common law” of individually adjudicated cases).
140. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 484, 269 P.3d at 231; see also id. at 543–46, 269 P.3d at 260–61
(retaining jurisdiction to monitor implementation of ESHB 2261 reforms and article IX compliance
generally).
141. See Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 725–26 (discussing Thro’s proposal that
courts should adopt education funding standards from coordinate branches where possible).
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date the Court selected was 2018—the final implementation date
indicated by the Legislature in ESHB 2261 and SHB 2776. However,
nothing in the ruling expressly confined the article IX right to the
program and services defined by the Legislature, leaving ample room for
the Court to obligate the State to provide judicially defined services.
Despite these encouraging signs that the Court would monitor, rather
than dictate, legislative implementation of the ESHB 2261 reforms, the
Court quickly showed its impatience with the Legislature. In the summer
of 2012, the Court agreed to exercise its oversight by receiving an
annual progress report submitted by the State, and the Legislature
established a joint select committee to communicate with the Court via
these reports.142 But, evidently expecting that a ruling handed down the
week before a supplemental budget legislative session would trigger
major institutional reforms in sixty days, the Court soon criticized
legislative inaction.143 As predicted by the original dissent, in December
2012 the Court directed that the Legislature enact or otherwise provide
the Court with annual, interim benchmarks against which the Court
could gauge legislative progress toward full implementation.144 Even so,
viewed in the most deferential light, the Court’s first request for a “plan”
expressed the Court’s intent to respect the legislature’s authority to
establish guideposts for incremental implementation steps. In effect, the
Court initially importuned the Legislature to provide the judicial branch
with benchmarks so that the Court would not have to invent them or
derive them from other sources.145
In January 2014, notwithstanding the 2013–2015 biennial budget’s
investment of nearly $1 billion in new state K-12 funding, the Court
issued another order that not only called for an annual plan but also
appeared to broaden the supervisory scope.146 In the 2014 supplemental
142. Order of July 18, 2012, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227,
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/mcclearyOrder.pdf
[https://perma.cc/222L-AV8Q]; H. Con. Res. 4410, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). The order
also permitted the plaintiffs to respond to the state’s report.
143. See Order of Dec. 20, 2012, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
144. See id. Justice James Johnson dissented from the order. Dissent to Order of Dec. 20, 2012,
McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Compare id., with McCleary,
173 Wash. 2d at 547–50, 269 P.3d at 262–63 (Madsen, J., dissenting in part) (stating supervision
will be unhelpful or obstructive without benchmarks).
145. Cf. Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 5, 9, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (looking to
executive budget requests and other proposals not enacted by the Legislature to gauge progress).
146. Id. at 5. Compare id. at 6 (objecting to suspension of school employee-cost-of-living
adjustments, court declares that “nothing could be more basic than adequate pay”), with McGowan
v. State, 148 Wash. 2d 278, 293–94, 60 P.3d 67, 74–75 (2002) (noting such adjustments are not part
of basic education).
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budget, the Legislature enacted an additional $58 million in K-12
formula funding, along with substantive policy implementation of basic
education enhancements to graduation requirements and course credits,
but it did not pass a “plan” as required by the Court.147 In September of
2014, after this second failure, the Court ruled that the Legislature’s
apparent inaction constituted contempt of Court, though it held sanctions
in abeyance until after the close of the 2015 session.148
Given the contempt ruling, the legal and political stakes were high as
the Legislature began its 2015 regular session. The 2015 session was the
longest on record, entailing three special sessions that lasted well into
July. Throughout the prolonged budget debates, the two chambers
generally agreed on funding the phase-in steps of the statutory formula
enhancements.149 However, the bodies struggled to achieve consensus on
a solution to the structural150 compensation shortfall, in which
insufficient state salary allocations cause school districts to supplement
state salary funding with local levy revenue in violation of Seattle
School District. Although the Legislature did not resolve this debate
during the 2015 session, nor did it pass a “plan,” on the eve of the fiscal
new year the chambers enacted a budget that provided $1.3 billion in
new state funding for K-12, a nineteen percent increase over the
previous biennium and a thirty-six percent increase since the Court’s
order of December 2012 decried the lack of progress.151 This funding
147. See 2014 REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT BY THE JOINT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ARTICLE IX LITIGATION 15–24, 27 (describing formula and policy changes but
acknowledging that the Legislature had not enacted an implementation “plan”).
148. See Order of Sept. 11, 2014, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
149. Compare S.S.B. 6050, 64th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2016) (initial Senate 2015-17
operating budget proposal), with E.S.H.B. 1106, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2016) (initial House
2015–2017 operating budget proposal).
150. From a state perspective, the compensation problem identified by the court is structural
(state salary allocations to districts are insufficient to hire and retain) rather than absolute (total
salaries offered by districts are insufficient to do so). The state’s data indicate that the total salaries
teachers actually receive (state allocations plus local supplements) provide market-rate
compensation comparable to similar professions, such as certified public accountants. JOHN
BOESENBERG ET AL., QUALITY EDUCATION COUNCIL, COMPENSATION TECHNICAL WORKING
GROUP FINAL REPORT 111 (2012), http://www.k12.wa.us/Compensation/CompTechWorkGroup
Report/CompTechWorkGroup.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6W8-K82G] (market comparability studies of
Dr. Lori Taylor). This means that the constitutional problem with salary funding is not market
inadequacy of total salaries; it is that a portion of salaries for the state’s program is paid from school
district taxpayers’ pockets (in the form of school district levies) rather than those of the state
taxpayers. Seattle School District held, and McCleary confirmed, that the State may not cause
school districts to rely on local levies to support the State’s program. McCleary 173 Wash. 2d at
537–39, 269 P.3d at 257–58.
151. 2015 REPORT, supra note 11, at 5–7 (describing state education spending increases but
acknowledging that the Legislature had not enacted an implementation “plan”).

Fraser_Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

3/1/2016 1:49 PM

MCCLEARY: RIGHTS, POWERS, AND PROTECTIONS

117

implemented the formula enhancements of SHB 2776 in compliance
with the respective due dates enacted in that bill.152
Notwithstanding the Legislature’s funding increases and compliance
with its own statutory schedule, in August of 2015 the Court declared
that the Legislature’s actions failed to purge contempt, and as of this
writing the Court has ordered sanctions against the State of $100,000 per
day until the Legislature provides the Court with a plan.153 This order
states that the plan must include not merely a list of reforms or a
schedule for implementation, but apparently also must address the fiscal
means—the State must “fully explain how it will achieve the required
goals.”154
III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF POSITIVE RIGHTS POSES
SEPARATION OF POWERS RISKS
The State’s efforts to move toward full compliance with McCleary
and article IX will involve complex fiscal analysis and legislative
drafting, as well as difficult political compromise. On top of these nearterm legislative challenges, the broader issue of judicially enforceable
positive rights poses substantial difficulties in constitutional practice.
This Part will briefly discuss the separation of powers risks of the
apparently unbounded positive rights enforced in McCleary.
McCleary initially called for a dialogic approach, claiming that
judicial oversight to monitor the legislative response would have “the
benefit of fostering dialogue and cooperation between coordinate
branches of state government in facilitating the constitutionally required
reforms.”155 A risk of dialogic enforcement, however, is that it fails to

152. Id. at 3–4. All elements of SHB 2776’s formula enhancements were fully implemented in
the 2015–2017 biennial budget, except for one remaining increment of K-3 class size reduction,
which must be implemented by the 2017–2018 school year. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.260(4)(b)
(2014 & Supp. 2015); 2015 REPORT, supra note 11, at 9. In 2014, the Legislature implemented
ESHB 2261’s changes to instructional hours (school year 2015–2016) and graduation credits
(beginning with the class of 2019, i.e., school year 2015–2016). WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220
(2014 & Supp. 2015). The Legislature has not specified a due date in statute for as-yet unquantified
reforms to compensation and levies. See 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 3331, 3332 (“The legislature
intends that the redefined program of basic education and funding for the program be fully
implemented by 2018.”); id. at 3331, 3369–71 (declaring intent to enhance salary allocations with
no date specified); id. at 3331, 3356–57 (declaring intent to revise levies with no date specified); see
also WASH. REV. CODE § 84.52.0531 (2014 & Supp. 2015) (causing current school levy lids to
expire in 2018, creating a “cliff” by which Legislature must address levy reform).
153. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
154. Id.
155. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 546, 269 P.3d at 261.
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account for the “the elephant in the room”—separation of powers in
state constitutions.156 Washington lacks an express textual separation of
powers requirement, but nonetheless it has both a vigorous separation of
powers doctrine157 and express provisions that vest fiscal controls solely
in the legislative branch.158
The McCleary Court acknowledged the separation of powers
difficulties in a positive rights analysis, but easily resolved the dilemma
in favor of the judicial branch. Positive rights “test the limits of judicial
restraint and discretion by requiring the Court to take a more active
stance in ensuring that the State complies with its affirmative
constitutional duty,” but judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation
trumps any counterarguments.159
Even so, because of the qualitatively different nature of positive
constitutional rights, judicial enforcement of these rights in the form of
orders to co-equal branches poses separation of powers risks not found
in other forms of constitutional enforcement. First, the absence of state
jurisdictional constraints on judicial actions creates the risk of the
“perceived imperative to decide,” inviting the courts to intrude into
policy decisions for which they are institutionally ill-suited. Second, if
the court defines a constitutional term to include a particular
constellation of affirmative services, the legislative branch is left without
a check on that definition, impairing its ability to make policy and fiscal
decisions for the state. Third, the dialogue of constitutional enforcement
must not convert judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation to
judicial supremacy in governing, lest it vitiate the Legislature’s status as
a co-equal branch.
A.

Separation of Powers Risks Arise from the “Perceived Imperative
to Decide”
When reviewing a case that is rooted in both politics and the state

156. Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 739–40; see id. at 728–35 (questioning
assumptions of positive rights scholars due to their “dismissive” belief that the separation of powers
doctrine does not affect adjudication).
157. See, e.g., State v. Rice, 174 Wash. 2d 885, 900–01, 279 P.3d 849 (2013) (citing recent
cases); Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash. 2d 129, 134 n.1, 882 P.2d 173, 177 n.1 (1994) (explaining that
federal separation of powers doctrine does not control interpretation of state constitution); In re
Salary of Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1978) (discussing history of doctrine).
158. See infra Section IV.A.
159. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 520, 269 P.3d at 248. Compare id., with Seattle Sch. Dist. v.
State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 512, 585 P.2d 71, 92 (1978) (explaining that article IX duty imposed on the
state as a polity, not on any one of the three branches).
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constitution, state court judges must confront the “perceived imperative
to decide.”160 This apparent mandate invites a judicial belief that all
politico-legal disputes are amenable to a courthouse resolution—that a
constitutional ruling can solve complex problems of public policy and
resource allocation. Stated differently, if one’s only tool is a hammer,
every problem looks like a nail.161 As described by Phil Talmadge, who
served both as a state senator and later as a Washington State Supreme
Court justice, “[w]hat has emerged too often is a cowboy judiciary riding
roughshod over separation of powers in its zeal to save every damsel in
distress and right every wrong.”162
The perceived imperative to decide arises from the absence of
jurisdictional limits on the authority of state courts. Principles of judicial
restraint in state courts are jurisprudential rather than jurisdictional.163
This means the political question doctrine and related theories of
restraint are not a per se bar to judicial consideration of essentially
political disputes such as legislative resource allocation decisions. For
that reason, the court is not obligated to make a threshold jurisdictional
determination of whether the constitution textually commits a matter to
one of the other branches.164 Positive rights advocates specifically argue
that the absence of jurisdictional limits on state courts should embolden
judges to enforce positive rights.165
Contributing to the perceived imperative to decide is the experience
of state court judges in affirmatively making law as common-law
jurists.166 To the extent judges have a law-making role in adjudicating
160. Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General
Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 695, 710 (1999) [hereinafter Talmadge, Limits of
Power].
161. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE 15 (1966).
162. Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 695–96 (condemning judicial activism of
both the left and the right).
163. Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 27, at 1833–75 (distinguishing state court
justiciability from article III jurisdictional doctrines); Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at
1155–69 (distinguishing a state constitutional positive rights analysis from federal rationality
review). Compare id., with Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 708–11 (contrasting state
and federal court doctrines of restraint).
164. Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 710. In contrast are cases involving the
Washington State Supreme Court’s narrow original jurisdiction in mandamus. See, e.g., Brown v.
Owen, 165 Wash. 2d 706, 718, 206 P.3d 310, 316 (2009) (no original jurisdiction in mandamus due
to separation of powers concerns “similar to” the federal political question doctrine).
165. Herskhoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1156–67 (contrasting state court adjudication of
positive rights with Article III political question doctrine).
166. Usman, supra note 27, at 1527–28. Compare id., with Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra
note 160, at 699 (describing the power of common law as individualized decision-making, given
that legislatures cannot anticipate all factual circumstances).
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common-law cases, they are comfortable testing out their theories
against a background of court-made precedent.167 This risk is reinforced
by judges who are “doctrinally oriented toward the individualized, nongeneral decision-making that the common law offers.”168 But state
constitutions are not common law.169 Constitutional interpretation is
document-based, a fundamentally different task. It involves not only
interpretation of individual words and sections, but the balancing of
particular rights, duties, or terminology against the background of the
entire constitutional text and structure. Moreover, constitutional
interpretation of an affirmative duty applies not only to the facts of the
case at bar, but throughout the entire state until reversed by a
constitutional amendment or subsequent judicial decision.
Any skepticism about the court’s ability to solve persistent policy and
political debates with constitutional rulings inevitably raises a question:
having chosen to elevate education to a constitutional duty, are the
voters not entitled to the benefit of their “constitutional bargain”?170 In
this view, the judiciary is not a participant in an inter-branch power
struggle, but rather is the neutral arbiter of the people’s compact with the
state.171 The analogy of Odysseus and the sirens is sometimes used to
characterize the nature of this compact172: when sailing past the sirens’
isle, Odysseus wishes to hear their song without succumbing to their
fatal allure, so he directs his sailors to stop their ears with wax and bind
him to the ship’s mast while ignoring any pleas he might make for
release.173 In other words, if a society feared that the siren song of
167. As makers of common law, judges not only adjudicate but also create and abolish commonlaw causes of action. Compare Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980)
(abolishing the common-law tort of alienation of affections), with Ueland v. Pengo Hydra-Pull
Corp., 103 Wash. 2d 131, 690 P.2d 190 (1984) (recognizing a new common cause of action for loss
of parental consortium). Compare id., with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.04.010 (2014 & Supp. 2015)
(establishing common law as rule of decision to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the state
constitution or statutes, or with the conditions of society in the state).
168. Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note 160, at 695.
169. Linde, supra note 98, at 952 (“In the course of deciding the merits, some opinions ignore the
essential difference between constitutional law and common law: A constitutional issue presupposes
that someone else has made a law.”).
170. Usman, supra note 27, at 1517.
171. Whether the McCleary Court is acting as a mere neutral arbiter of the constitution is in the
eye of the beholder. Certainly by using the threat of contempt and later contempt sanctions to
compel not ultimate constitutional compliance but rather submission of the court-ordered “plan,” the
Court has staked the dignity and credibility of the judicial branch on its ability to coerce the
Legislature.
172. See Todd E. Pettys, Popular Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the
People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U.L. REV. 313, 324–27 (2008) (criticizing the Odysseus analogy).
173. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 273 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996) (“[I]f you plead, commanding your
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transitory legislative or voter majorities could result in failure to satisfy a
core value expressed in the constitution, the voters could codify their
“pre-commitments” in a higher level of law not subject to
reinterpretation by a mere temporary political agreement.174 In this
scenario, of course, the judiciary ultimately determines the meaning of
this pre-commitment. Or, as framed by the McCleary Court: “We cannot
abdicate our judicial duty to interpret and construe” the constitution.175
This perceived imperative to define the constitution’s education rights
in the form of a judicial ruling disregards other aspects of the voters’
electoral bargain in the constitutional text. The constitution expressly
vests in the legislative and executive branches the responsibility for
defining and operating the state’s education system.176 As noted by Phil
Talmadge, constitutionalizing K-12 funding and administration by
placing it beyond the control of these democratically elected state
officers leaves education under the control of a branch that is “illequipped to annex such a duty.”177 More broadly, as discussed infra
Section IV.A, the “disfavored” constitution establishes substantive
separation of powers protections that vest state fiscal decisions solely in
the legislature. Finally, whatever the merits the “Odysseus” approach
might have for interpreting restraints on state government, judicial
interpretation of constitutional terms in a positive rights context poses a
different issue.
B.

Positive Rights Pose Qualitatively Unique Separation of Powers
Dilemmas

A positive constitutional right is very different than other legal rights
to state-funded services. From Marbury to Seattle School District,
judicial primacy in interpreting constitutional text means that the court
has the ultimate ability to define constitutional terms. This power has

men to set you free, then they must lash you faster, rope on rope.”).
174. Pettys, supra note 172, at 324–27.
175. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 520, 169 P.3d 227, 246 (2012) (quoting Seattle Sch.
Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 506, 585 P.2d 71, 88 (1978)). Compare id., with Seattle Sch. Dist.,
90 Wash. 2d at 512, 585 P.2d at 92 (explaining that duty is imposed on the State as a polity, not on
any one of the three branches).
176. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 516–17, 169 P.3d at 247; see also WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2
(“The legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.”); WASH.
CONST. art. III, § 22 (“The superintendent of public instruction shall have supervision over all
matters pertaining to public schools.”).
177. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 237, 5 P.3d 691, 710 (2000) (Talmadge, J.,
concurring).
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two consequences. First, when the court uses this primacy to define
positive rights, it deprives the Legislature of its ability to make policy
and fiscal choices about the constitutional subject. Second, it could
hijack the legislative process, compelling the Legislature to legislate
prospectively to the court’s standards rather than testing enacted
legislation against constitutional requirements.
1.

Positive Rights Interpretation Is Unlike Other Forms of Judicial
Rights Adjudication

In the course of state policy-setting, legislatures frequently create
positive statutory rights to public programs and services, but the
legislature retains the ability to revise or repeal its creations.178 Once the
legislature has enacted such a statute, the judiciary may order agencies to
provide services to individuals as a matter of statutory entitlement,179 but
crucially—as a matter of separation of powers—the court will not order
the legislature to make an appropriation for a statutory program.180 It is a
“legislative fact of life” that the legislature may create “laudable
programs” but fail to fund them adequately: “the decision to create a
program as well as whether and to what extent to fund it is strictly a
legislative prerogative.”181
Likewise, when the courts enforce negative constitutional rights
against the branch that allocates public resources, the legislature still
retains a choice. The choice may be largely theoretical, but it still exists.
For example, though it may be politically difficult to cut services to
persons with mental illness, if the state does not want to fund costs the
judiciary determines are needed to comply with Fourteenth Amendment
standards, the state may change involuntary commitment statutes,
178. Cross, supra note 27, at 861 (describing the notion of statutory positive rights as “utterly
unexceptionable); see also Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 301–02, 174 P.3d
1142, 1150 (2007) (citing Kristen L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner:
Washington’s Law of Law-Making, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 447, 478 (2003–2004) (explaining plenary
legislative power means that one legislature may amend the work of a prior legislature).
179. Wash. State Coal. for the Homeless v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Serv., 133 Wash. 2d 894,
923–95, 949 P.2d 1291, 1306–07 (1997). Compare id., with Talmadge, Limits of Power, supra note
160, at 730 (criticizing Homeless as a “very troubling” ruling that puts court in the middle of a
societal dispute about resource distribution).
180. Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wash. 2d 591, 599, 589 P.2d 1235, 1240 (1979) (noting a possible
exception if creation of a program is constitutionally required); see also Talmadge, Limits of Power,
supra note 160, at 729–30 (discussing separation of powers basis for Pannell line of decisions).
181. Pannell, 91 Wash. 2d at 599, 589 P.2d at 1240; see also Farm Bureau Fed’n, 162 Wash. 2d
at 301–02, 174 P.3d at 1150. Compare id., with McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 526–27, 269 P.3d at
251–52 (declaring that court may interpret Article IX to limit legislature’s ability to reduce offerings
in the basic education program).
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reprioritize executive branch commitment efforts, or repeal its
commitment statutes entirely.182
In contrast to statutory positive rights, and in contrast to “negative”
constitutional rights, positive constitutional rights leverage the judicial
branch’s interpretative power to compel the legislative branch to create
and fund public programs as defined by the court. Where the court
defines a positive right, the state has no choice183: the judicial branch has
final say in defining the program.184 Under this analytical regime, absent
a constitutional amendment, the duty of the state—and its taxpayers—to
fund that definition is absolute.
2.

Only the Legislature Can Provide Meaningful Definitions of
Positive Rights

From the single constitutional word “education,” the Seattle School
District Court developed a multi-paragraph description of the
constitutional education objective. But, this necessarily vague definition
could not, on its own, translate into the multiplicity of complex formulae
by which the Legislature allocates state K-12 funding to school districts
based on districts’ and students’ needs.185 As Cooley puts it, because the
texts of constitutional affirmative duties in themselves do not provide a
“sufficient rule” for determining the scope of right or duty,
“supplemental legislation must be had.”186
The constitutional duty and its judicially created corresponding right
lack meaning and coherence unless defined and rendered operative in
statutory policies enacted by the people’s representatives. For this
reason, the legislature has an intended constitutional role in defining
how the state implements its duty.
The Seattle School District and McCleary Courts imposed judicial
definitions of constitutional terms such as “education” and “ample,” but
Seattle School District wholly deferred to legislation to implement and
182. But see infra Section III.B.3 notes 197–199 and accompanying text (discussing how under
the “foster and support” clause, the State may have a positive duty to operate mental health
facilities).
183. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1897 (describing democratic concern that positive rights
enforcement requires courts to displace legislative judgments on a large scale).
184. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 516, 269 P.3d at 246–47 (endorsing Seattle School District’s
judicial definition of “education”); id. at 526–27, 269 P.3d 251–52 (holding that the legislature’s
education definition is not set “in constitutional stone” but the Court may impose limits on future
legislatures’ ability to amend statutory program of education).
185. See WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.220–.260 (2014 & Supp. 2015) (defining mandatory
program offerings and establishing general apportionment formulas).
186. COOLEY, supra note 41, at 98–99.
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give life to these terms, and McCleary initially did so, endorsing enacted
legislative reforms. In the absence of a ruling that relates the judicial
definition to legislative enactments, positive constitutional rights are
unmoored from the statutes that are constitutionally and practically
needed to implement them. When constitutional duties are stated so
broadly as to be inchoate absent implementing legislation, they cannot
be uprooted from their bases in the text of a foundational document to
become free-floating judicial mandates on the taxpayer.
3.

Positive Rights Enforcement Risks Commandeering the Legislative
Process

Continued judicial oversight poses the risk that the judicial power of
constitutional interpretation will be used to compel the Legislature to
enact particular policy and appropriation laws. If the McCleary Court
had confined its enforcement activities to overseeing incremental
implementation of scheduled statutory reforms, retained jurisdiction
would pose less of a risk to legislative policy-making. But the Court’s
orders have evolved from a request for interim benchmarks to insistence
on a comprehensive plan to “fully comply with article IX” by achieving
“full funding of all elements of basic education,” whatever the Court
believes that to mean.187 Each order introduces a judicial demand for the
Legislature to address a new aspect of K-12 funding, from cost-of-living
adjustments188 to capital construction189 funding to, in one possible
interpretation, new taxes.190
In the case of positive rights, where the judicial branch is asking in
the abstract whether the state has “done enough” rather than “done too
much,”191 the court could use its interpretation of the constitutional text
187. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 1, 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
188. See supra note 146.
189. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 7, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227. Although the trial
court’s order briefly declared that state facilities funding was inadequate, the 2012 McCleary ruling
did not address the state’s capital funding formulas, much less invalidate them the way it did the
pre-ESHB 2261 operating formulas. McCleary v. State, No. 07-2-02323-2 SEA at 55 (King Cty.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2010). For school construction, the constitution prescribes a plan of shared
responsibility between the State and school districts, which the State has implemented through the
School Construction Assistance Program. See WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (school district capital
levies and construction bond levies); id. art. VIII, § 1(e) (state guarantee of school district debt); id.
art. VIII, § 6 (school district debt limits for construction); id. art. IX, § 3 (Common School
Construction Fund); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.525.162–.166 (2014 & Supp. 2015).
190. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (requiring the State
to explain “not only what it expects to achieve . . . but to fully explain how it will achieve the
required goals” (emphasis in original)).
191. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d, at 518–19, 269 P.3d at 248 (citing Hershkoff, Positive Rights,
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to order the state and its taxpayers to create and pay for a variety of
programs. Bypassing the legislative process of policy-setting and
resource allocation, judicial enforcement of the education right could
remove a large portion of the budget from legislative control. As Phil
Talmadge cautions, the Court must avoid characterizing education rights
as “absolute,” because doing so arrogates to the judiciary total
responsibility for operating the state’s education system.192
In education litigation in other states, concern about the judiciary’s
ability to turn constitutional text into workable funding standards has
either changed liability decisions or stayed enforcement.193 In particular,
second-generation cases such as McCleary pose enforcement challenges
for courts that have already found strong positive rights.194 In secondround cases, the court confronts not legislative abdication, but instead an
active legislative branch with its own evolving vision of adequacy, so
the court must parse the adequacy of a comprehensive legislative
response rather than direct the legislature to fill a statutory vacuum. As
school conditions and the elusive constitutional standard converge,
breach becomes more difficult to establish.195 Further, some scholars
express doubt that funding alone can change schools, “contending that
the solution lies not in more money, but in measures such as increased
accountability, better management, and the flexibility to fire failing
teachers.”196 If the court ventures further into education litigation, it
could be asked to impose these types of standards by judicial fiat.
Finally, education is not the only state duty that the judicial branch
could transform into a positive right, creating the risk that a still larger
portion of the state budget could be subject to judicial definition and
more stringent constitutional scrutiny. For example, constitutional
provisions such as the “foster and support”197 clause of article XIII could
supra note 27, at 1137).
192. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash. 2d 201, 237, 5 P.3d 691, 710 (2000) (Talmadge, J.,
concurring).
193. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 26, at 100 (citing the example of Massachusetts, where
“[f]orced to choose between an aggressive remedial stance and abdication of any role in
adjudicating the education right,” the court bowed out by refusing to find breach).
194. Id. at 97–111.
195. Id. at 102–03.
196. Id. at 96–97 (citing authorities). Compare id., with McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 539–40, 269
P.3d at 258 (stating that “fundamental reforms are needed . . . . Pouring more money into an
outmoded system will not succeed,” statements which in this author’s opinion are frequently
misinterpreted as a statement from the McCleary Court that these types of management reforms are
required for McCleary compliance).
197. WASH. CONST. art XIII, § 1; see also Adam Sherman & Hugh Spitzer, Washington’s
Mandate: The Constitutional Obligation to Fund Post-Secondary Education, 89 WASH. L. REV.
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be interpreted to establish state duties and corresponding Hohfeldian
rights. Although the education right may be “paramount” among these
duties, if the courts recognize other positive constitutional rights, they
will be different only in degree, not in kind.198 Subjecting state
expenditures for these purposes to the “has the state done enough?”
positive rights analysis would make over two-thirds of the state budget
subject to McCleary-level scrutiny.199
C.

Primacy in Constitutional Interpretation Does Not Alter the CoEqual Status of the State Branches

Judicial enforcement of positive rights against the democratic
branches impairs the constitutionally established co-equal status of the
three departments. This risk arises because judicial primacy in
constitutional interpretation is not judicial supremacy in governing.
Positive rights advocates insist that state courts must “rise to the
challenge” and adjudicate positive rights cases despite possible judicial
difficulty in developing manageable standards and policy expertise.200
Admittedly, these types of exhortations have a basis in Washington’s
text: as Seattle School District explained, the article IX duty is imposed
on the State as a polity, not merely on the legislative branch.201 But the
real leverage sought by positive rights advocates in pursuit of their
preferred policies comes from the finality of the judicial branch’s
interpretation of a constitutional provision. In general, positive rights
scholarship strives to qualitatively distinguish state court powers from
those exercised by federal courts. But, advocates for positive rights must
necessarily rely on state courts to assert primacy in constitutional
interpretation, just as the Marbury Court asserted federal interpretational
primacy over Congress, and the Cooper Court over the states.202
Similarly, in Seattle School District and McCleary, state courts declare
the finality of their authority to interpret the constitution. But an
ONLINE 15, 32–33 (2014) (arguing that the “foster and support” clause establishes a duty to support
state higher education institutions).
198. See Hershkoff, Evolution of State Constitutions, supra note 27, at 817–18 (recognizing risks
of failing to constitutionalize all types of need).
199. See BUDGET NOTES, supra note 2, at 157, 163, 276, 305, 331, 351 (summarizing state 2015–
2017 appropriations for purposes potentially subject to article XIII, plus constitutionally protected
debt service, which is three percent of the NGFS + Op budget).
200. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1182.
201. Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d. 476 512, 585 P.2d 71, 91–92 (1978).
202. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (stating under Marbury and the Supremacy Clause, state
governments are bound by federal courts’ interpretation of the federal Constitution).
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important distinction remains: at the state court level, the alchemy of
positive rights interpretation does not convert judicial primacy in
interpretation into judicial supremacy in governing.203
To compel compliance with the federal Constitution, federal courts
are entitled to wield the power of the federal Supremacy Clause against
recalcitrant state actors.204 State courts have no such lever against state
legislatures, which are co-equal branches. Primacy in the authority to
interpret the constitution does not create a corresponding power of
enforcement. Unlike the federal government enforcing the supremacy of
the federal Constitution over the states, the Washington State Supreme
Court is acting against a co-equal branch.
Recognition of this concern does not rely on denial of the Court’s
interpretational primacy. As explained by Seattle School District, the
Court’s lack of “physical power” to enforce its orders does not affect its
duty to issue them; “the legality of judicial orders should not be
confused with the legal consequence of their breach.”205 But positive
rights do not change the recognized judicial function of “saying what the
law is” into a new ability to tell the Legislature “what the law must be.”
In the absence of express constraining principles, the Court’s new
positive rights jurisprudence impairs the Legislature’s status as a coequal branch. In the case of negative rights, it is less likely that the Court
will intrude on legislative policy-setting and resource allocation, because
the State always has the option of ceasing the violative conduct. But in
the case of positive rights, the Court is not restraining the democratic
branches with a “thou shalt not” or a “thou shalt not unless.” Rather, the
Court is affirmatively specifying the delivery of publicly funded
services, and short of a constitutional amendment, the Legislature has no

203. Education finance scholarship gives short shrift to concerns over the propriety of judicial
review. Bauries, Judicial Review, supra note 73, at 707.
204. In the case of confrontation among the co-equal branches of federal government, the United
States Supreme Court retains primacy in constitutional interpretation. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“[I]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of
constitutional guarantees.”). Certainly the Court may be asked to adjudicate constitutional questions
with vast fiscal consequences. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct
2566 (2012) (upholding federal Affordable Care Act). But, the Court may not tell Congress, a coequal branch, that it must enact legislation to fund, e.g., health care or education programs. The
absence of positive rights in the federal Constitution, together with federal principles of judicial
abstention such as the political question doctrine, mean that only Congress resolves resource
allocation questions.
205. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 507, 585 P.2d at 89 (citing Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,
711–12 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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check on this judicial affirmative definition.206 Further, under the new
positive rights analysis, notwithstanding the political aspects of the case,
the Legislature and its enactments receive even less protection, because
the Court now holds implementing legislation to a higher judicial
standard.207 This leaves the Legislature without a corresponding check
on the judicial branch’s authority to compel expenditures in furtherance
of a positive right. Regardless of what the Legislature enacts to
implement the constitution, the Court can always say “Article IX
requires more.”
IV. THE “DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION”
COUNTERBALANCES POSITIVE RIGHTS
By combining judicial primacy in constitutional interpretation with a
positive right, McCleary created a court-defined state funding obligation
without any expressly delineated jurisprudential boundaries. Though the
original McCleary ruling recognized the delicate balance of power
among the branches in positive rights implementation, the opinion and
its subsequent enforcement orders do not set out any clear doctrinal
limits on the Court’s ability to obligate the taxpayers to fund positive
rights. Absent counterbalancing constitutional strictures, the Legislature,
and the taxpayers from whom the Legislature must extract the state’s
fiscal resources, have only two options: fund the education right as
defined by the Court, or amend the constitution.
The Legislature’s repeated failure to enact the judicially ordered
“plan,” together with the approach of the legislatively and judicially
imposed 2018 deadline, will force the Court to determine whether there
are any outer limits to its authority to enforce positive rights against
legislative paralysis, intransigence, or outright defiance. To find these
limiting principles, the Court need look no further than the text of the
constitution itself.

206. Cf. MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3(3) (amended 1988). After Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis
applied higher scrutiny to classification in welfare legislation, the citizens amended the Montana
Constitution in 1988 to change “[t]he legislature shall provide such economic assistance” to “may
provide.” In re T.W., 126 P.3d 491, 495 & n.3 (Mont. 2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting MT.
CONST. art. 12, § 3).
207. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d, 477, 519, 269 P.3d 227, 248 (2012); see also supra
Section II.C, notes 131–135 and accompanying text.
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The “Disfavored Constitution” Establishes Protections for the
Public Fisc by Reserving Taxation and Expenditure Authority to
the Legislature

Limitations on judicial enforcement of positive rights are already
found within the constitutional text—in the so-called “disfavored
constitution.”208 By expressly vesting the taxing and spending powers of
the state solely in the legislative branch, the fiscal restrictions of the
disfavored constitution protect the legislature’s institutional powers. The
constitutional damage risked by potential judicial arrogation of the
legislative powers of taxation and spending affects not only the
legislative branch’s prerogatives, but also the substantive protections
afforded to the treasury and the taxpayers by the state constitution.
Within Washington’s disfavored constitution, article VII of the
Washington State Constitution establishes strictures on state taxation,
and article VIII governs debt and expenditures. More particularly, article
VII, section 5, and article VIII, section 4 provide respectively that taxes
and expenditures of treasury funds must be enacted in law.209 Each of
these sections further establishes specificity requirements—taxes must
state an object, and appropriations must state a readily discernable
amount and may not endure past the fiscal biennium.210
These provisions function as more than mere restraints on the
legislature. True—the specificity conditions operate as traditional
restrictions on the legislative process, requiring the legislature to enact
tax and spending laws in a particular way. But more importantly, the
statements that taxes and appropriations may be made only pursuant to
law are affirmations that the power to levy taxes and the power to spend
the revenues thereby collected are vested only in the peoples’
democratically elected representatives—to the exclusion of other
branches. To the extent that enforcement of positive rights could conflict
with these exclusive grants of authority, it is the Court’s obligation to
harmonize, rather than override, these protective portions of the

208. See supra Section I.B (discussing the disfavored constitution).
209. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (“No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law; and every
law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the object of the same to which only it shall be applied.”);
id. art. VIII, § 4 (“No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds,
or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law; nor
unless such payment be made within one calendar month after the end of the next ensuing fiscal
biennium, and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an
appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated, and the object to which it is to be
applied, and it shall not be sufficient for such law to refer to any other law to fix such sum.”).
210. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5; id. art. VIII, § 4.
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constitution.
1.

The Legislature Has Sole Authority over Taxation

Under article VII, section 5, “no tax shall be levied except in
pursuance of law; and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the
object of the same to which only it shall be applied.”211 Though buried in
the disfavored constitution, this section has a long pedigree as a shield
for taxpayers through protection of the prerogatives of their elected
representatives. As a condition of the ascension of William and Mary,
Parliament insisted that the English Bill of Rights prohibit taxation by
royal prerogative: “levying Money for or to the Use of the Crowne, by
pretence of Prerogative, without Grant of Parlyament, for longer time, or
in other manner then the same is or shall be granted, is Illegal.”212
Similar restrictions appear before nationhood in the earliest state
constitutions. John Adams’ eloquent Massachusetts State Constitution of
1780 led the way toward the tripartite, balanced government that the
Union would eventually adopt.213 As originally ratified, and to this day,
the Massachusetts Constitution declares that no tax may be levied
“without the consent of the people, or their representatives in the
legislature.”214 Likewise, taxpayer protections are reflected in the United
States Constitution, which declares that “All bills for raising revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives,” which at nationhood
was the federal chamber directly elected by the voters.215
Keeping this legacy in mind, article VII, section 5 is not a mere
technicality but an assurance that “Taxes can be voted only by the
people’s representatives.”216 “It is elementary that the power of taxation,
subject to constitutional limitations, rests solely in the legislature.”217 As
Cooley explained in 1883, the taxing power is inherent in the legislature
of each state, and security against the abuse of this power is found in the
structure of government itself: “In imposing a tax, the legislature acts
211. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
212. English Bill of Rights, 1689 (1 W&M., 2d Sess., c.2).
213. See WILLIAMS, supra note 23, at 50–53 (describing Adams’ view of balanced government).
214. MASS. CONST. of 1780 art. XXIII; see also PA. CONST. of 1776, § 41 (requiring that any tax
be authorized in law).
215. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
216. COOLEY, supra note 41, at 641 (“It is, moreover, essential to valid taxation that the taxing
officers be able to show legislative authority for the burden they assume to impose in every
instance.”).
217. Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wash. 2d 752, 770, 131 P.3d 892, 901 (2006)
(quoting State ex rel. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 176 Wash. 689, 690, 30 P.2d 638, 639 (1934)).
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upon its constituents.”218 Suggestions that the Court has authority to
enforce positive rights by nullifying tax exemptions, levying new taxes,
or specifying the uses of tax revenues directly conflict with this
constitutional principle.219 In its Order of August 2015, the McCleary
Court briefly but expressly recognized this distribution of powers,
acknowledging that the Court lacks the authority to enact legislation,
appropriate state funding, or levy taxes.220 As in the case of judicial
“impoundment” of unspecified state revenues pursuant to the August
2015 contempt sanctions, the judicial distinction between saying “what
the law is” and enforcing that law may be a very fine one.221 But the
difficulty in drawing the precise line does not negate the mandatory
character of disfavored constitution as a limiting principle on the Court’s
ability to enforce positive rights.
2.

The Legislature Has Sole Authority over Appropriations

Under article VIII, section 4, “No moneys shall ever be paid out of
the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or any of the funds under its
management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law.” Per
article VII, section 6, state tax revenues must be deposited in the state
treasury. This means that the Legislature has the exclusive power of
deciding whether, when, and for what purpose the state’s public moneys
may leave the treasury, and also that the procedural law-making
protections of constitutional majority, bicameralism, and presentment
are necessary to spend all state tax revenues. As with the taxing
provision, the requirement that appropriations be enacted in law is
rooted in the English Bill of Rights’ prohibition on arrogating moneys
for the use of the crown.222 The legislation requirement necessarily
excludes the judicial branch from the process of enacting appropriations
or otherwise authorizing expenditures.223
218. Id. at 593–94.
219. E.g., Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Timely 2016 Briefing Schedule at 13–15, McCleary v. State,
173 Wash. 2d, 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/
Supreme%20Court%20News/843627McClearyPlaintiffsMotionforTimely2016Briefing
Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJ3D-2E3T] (asking the court to invalidate tax exemption statutes as
a contempt sanction).
220. Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 8, McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
221. See supra Section III.B.1, notes 178–181 and accompanying text (discussing potentially fine
distinction between ordering an appropriation and ordering an agency to provide a service).
222. English Bill of Rights, 1689 (1 W&M., 2d Sess., c.2).
223. “Whether such a [court-appointed special master] could take money out of the treasury
would be a really significant constitutional question on the separation of powers” according to
former Washington State Supreme Court Justice Phil Talmadge. Andrew Garber, How Will State
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The legislature’s duty to provide essential funding for the other
branches of government must be acknowledged as a noteworthy but
limited exception to this general rule. In In re Salary of Juvenile
Director,224 the Court used a structural separation of powers analysis to
find the Court has an inherent but constrained power to compel
appropriations necessary to “ensure its own survival”225 upon “clear,
cogent, and convincing proof.”226 Significantly, Juvenile Director did
not analyze the text, purpose, or history of article VIII, section 4 in the
broader context of constitutional protections for tax revenues.227 But
Juvenile Director addresses only the judiciary’s ability to function
within the constitutional structure as an independent branch, and under
article VIII, section 4, it gives the Court no authority to order
expenditures for other types of state programs, constitutionally required
or not.228
3.

The Disfavored Constitution Establishes a Principle of
Contemporaneous Government

Article VIII, section 4, establishes a principle of contemporaneous
government, a concept that limits the usefulness of the Court’s repeated
calls for a legislative “plan.”
Specifically, this section provides that appropriations must be made
within a month of the close of the next ensuing biennium, i.e., the
biennium that begins after the adjournment of the legislative session in
odd numbered years.229 This means that appropriations lapse (expire) at
the end of the fiscal biennium for which they are made, so each elected
Legislature appropriates roughly for the period for which it sits. The
delegates at the state constitutional convention established this limited
Supreme Court React If Lawmakers Hold Back on School Funding?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 24, 2014
at B7.
224. 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976).
225. Id. at 245, 552 P.2d at 171..
226. Id. at 251, 552 P.2d at 174. In Seattle School District, the State argued based on Juvenile
Director that a higher burden of proof should apply to the education duty. The Court dismissed this
distinction: “Here, unlike Juvenile Director, the financial needs of the judiciary vis-à-vis the
Legislature are not at issue. Rather, we are concerned with legislative compliance with a specific
constitutional mandate.” Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d. 476, 528, 585 P.2d 71, 100 (1978).
227. See Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d at 242–43, 552 P.2d at 169 (citing WASH. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4 only in passing).
228. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 528, 585 P.2d at 100.
229. At statehood, regular sessions of the Legislature were held biennially beginning in January
of odd-numbered years, with a two-year budget adopted for the period following adjournment.
WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. II, § 12.
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duration for appropriations because California had exceeded its debt
limit by authorizing appropriations for future biennia.230
When combined with the broader constitutional principles that
legislative power is plenary and any Legislature may amend the work of
a prior Legislature,231 article VIII, section 4 affirms that the people are
governed by the legislators they elected, not by dead hands of prior
legislators. Although the Court has declared that the Legislature may not
revise its basic education statutes for mere pecuniary reasons,232 no
Legislature may definitively declare that any “plan” commits a future
Legislature to follow any particular set of standards, formulas, or
revenue policies, and no Legislature may “pre-enact” the appropriations
needed to give future life to the “plan.” Stated differently, talk is
cheap—whiskey costs money. The real question is whether the sitting
Legislature has enacted the appropriations to implement its enacted
statutes.
B.

The Disfavored Constitution’s Taxpayer Protections Are a Part of
the “Electoral Bargain”

If state courts wish to accept the expansive aspects of state
constitutionalism, such as the New Federalism and positive rights, they
must acknowledge the constraints of the disfavored constitution as
requirements of equal stature.233 Even “as they impose affirmative duties
on their government, state constitutions are also marked by limitedgovernment, taxpayer-protective principles that are entirely absent from
the Federal Constitution.”234
Positive rights advocates correctly argue that analysis of positive
rights should not import federal concepts that are extraneous to state
constitutions, such as rationality-level review or the political question
230. JOURNAL, supra note 69, at 673–75; see also S.F. Gas Co. v. Brickwedel, 62 Cal. 641, 642
(1882) (holding article XI, section 18 of the California Constitution prohibited municipalities from
paying liabilities incurred in one year with revenues of a later year absent the 2/3 voter approval
constitutionally necessary to incur debt). In comparison, the modern Washington constitutional debt
limit in article VIII, section 1 requires a supermajority legislative vote to bind future Legislatures by
creating debt. WASH. CONST. art VIII, § 1(i) (amended 1972).
231. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Gregoire, 162 Wash. 2d 284, 301–02, 174 P.3d 1142, 1150 (2007)
(citing Kristen L. Fraser, Method, Procedure, Means, and Manner: Washington’s Law of LawMaking, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 447, 478 (2003–2004)).
232. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 526–27, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (holding that elements
of the basic education program are not “etched in constitutional stone,” but the Legislature may not
eliminate or reduce program offering without an educational reason).
233. Briffault, supra note 18, at 956.
234. Id.
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doctrine.235 Using state tax and spending restrictions as a restraint on
judicial positive rights enforcement flows naturally from the bargain that
the state constitution strikes with the people in its own text. The
disfavored constitution provides the judiciary with the ability to give
meaning to affirmative duties in state constitutions while acknowledging
that the very text of state constitutions contains outer boundaries on the
court’s ability to define and enforce positive rights.
1.

The Disfavored Constitution Is Substantive and Mandatory

The paramount duty may be paramount among constitutional
provisions that establish rights or duties, but the judiciary is obligated to
harmonize its interpretation of this duty, and enforcement thereunder of
its jural correlative right, with the structural provisions of the
constitution that place the state fisc under the authority of the voters’
representatives.
Positive rights commentators argue courts must enforce positive
rights so “the electorate should be given the benefit of their
constitutional bargain.”236 Further, as the Seattle School District and
McCleary Courts point out, only one provision of the constitution
declares itself to be “paramount.” At the same time, positive rights are
only one part of the “electoral bargain.” Just as article IX
constitutionalizes a state education duty, the disfavored constitution
constitutionalizes a norm of taxpayer protection.237
To begin, all provisions of the constitution are equally mandatory.238
The constitutional text declares the education duty to be “paramount”
among state activities, but this text does not make other provisions
structurally subordinate, and it does not overwrite the equally mandatory
provisions that vest taxing and spending authority solely in the
Legislature.
Moreover, “structural” provisions of state constitutions may
nonetheless declare protective principles that that receive judicial
enforcement. For example, Washington’s Constitution does not contain
an express textual separation of powers clause, but the division of state
government into three branches is nonetheless a crucial protection for

235. E.g, Herskhoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1156–67 (contrasting state court
adjudication of positive rights with article III political question doctrine).
236. Usman, supra note 27, at 1517. Compare id., with Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1915 (coupling
strong right with weak remedies may create cynicism about the constitution).
237. Briffault, supra note 18, at 909.
238. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29.
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individual liberties.239 Similarly, though not expressly framed as a
“rights” provision, the disfavored constitution provides important
protection for the public fisc and for the people’s relationship with their
elected representatives. Further, McCleary itself demonstrates that not
all constitutional rights are found in constitutional articles denominated
“Declaration of Rights.” The tax and spending restrictions in the
disfavored constitution place in the constitutional text the people’s right
to have state fiscal policy determined by their elected representatives.
More broadly, when considering the electoral bargain, a constitutional
analysis of positive rights enforcement must consider the source of the
government’s powers and duties—the political power that is inherent in
the people and is bestowed on government only by their consent.240
Under the covenant by which the voters delegated their political power
to state government, the people were assured that their elected
representatives would control state taxation and expenditures. Though
some positive rights advocates contend that elected state court judges
enjoy a democratic imprimatur that justifies a greater role for them in
public resource allocation decisions,241 Washington courts have rejected
the notion that state court judges play a “representative” role in state
government.242 For these reasons, judicial branch enforcement of
positive rights must respect the constitutional vesting of fiscal authority
in officials who are elected to represent their constituents.
Evidence that the electoral bargain of the disfavored constitution
creates taxpayer protections is found in flexible doctrines of taxpayer
standing in state courts. In contrast to stringent standing requirements in
federal court, Washington and other state courts generally grant broad
taxpayer standing to enforce constitutional protections for the public
fisc.243 These decisions reveal “an appreciation of the role that taxpayer
239. E.g., State v. Rice, 174 Wash. 2d 885, 900–01, 279 P.3d 849, 857 (2013) (discussing how
the tripartite division and system of checks protects individual rights in the criminal justice system).
240. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
241. Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 27, at 1157–58; see also Hershkoff, Passive Virtures,
supra note 27, at 1887 (claiming elected judges “carry a democratic portfolio”); Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1993)
(“[State court judges’] institutional position can be thought of as intermediate between that of
federal judges and that of elected representatives.”). However, Hershkoff acknowledged that
election does not turn “black-robed judges into representative decisionmakers.” Hershkoff, Positive
Rights, supra note 27, at 1158.
242. Eugster v. State, 171 Wash. 2d 839, 259 P.3d 146 (2011) (holding judiciary’s role is distinct
from legislative branch due to obligations of impartiality and independence; election of judges does
not make them like legislative or administrative elected officials whose core duties are to speak for
and carry out their constituents’ interests).
243. Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? Linking State Constitutional
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suits play in correcting government transgressions.”244 Notably, flexible
taxpayer standing is an important link between positive rights advocacy
and the disfavored constitution, where this standing is used to enforce
state constitutions’ “positive rights and regulatory norms,” including
constitutional restrictions on taxes, debt, and expenditures.245
2.

Nevada’s Interpretational Misstep Demonstrates the Duty to
Harmonize Education Rights and the Disfavored Constitution

Because of its disfavored status of state fiscal protections, courts may
be tempted to use interpretational techniques that allow “rights”
provisions to eclipse mere “structural” provisions. Nevada’s failed
interpretational experiment underscores the need for Washington to
employ the interpretational technique mandated by article I, section 29’s
statement that all provisions are mandatory.
After a brief flirtation with allowing “substantive” constitutional
duties to trump “procedural” fiscal provisions, Nevada quickly reversed
its position and conceded judicial interpretation requires the State to read
its constitution as a whole, with each provision harmonized. In Guinn v.
Legislature,246 the Nevada Supreme Court faced “legislative paralysis”
over the votes needed to pass a school appropriations bill and supporting
revenue legislation, given a fairly new voter-initiated constitutional
amendment that required a two-thirds legislative vote to increase
taxes.247 The Guinn Court concluded that when “a procedural
requirement that is general in nature prevents funding for a basic,
substantive right, the procedure must yield,” and the supermajority
provision could not be used to avoid other constitutional duties.248 But
Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing Doctrines, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263, 1290–
91 (2012).
244. Friends of N. Spokane Parks v. Spokane, 184 Wash. App. 105, 116–20, 336 P.3d 632, 638
(Ct. App. 2014) (discussing taxpayer standing at length, distinguishing Greater Harbor, and citing
Urquhart, supra note 243). Compare id., with Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d
267, 281, 37 P.2d 1082, 1090 (1997) (requiring greater showing for taxpayer standing to challenge
discretionary decision).
245. Hershkoff, Passive Virtues, supra note 27, at 1889–90; Urquhart, supra note 243, at 1290–
91.
246. Guinn v. Legislature (Guinn II), 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003). Guinn II denied a rehearing of
Guinn v. Legislature (Guinn I), 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003). Eventually, Guinn II was overruled by
Nevadans for Nevada v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006). The Guinn Court assumed that the
Nevada Constitution imposed a “mandate” to fund public education. Guinn II, 76 P.3d at 31 (citing
constitutional provisions).
247. Guinn II, 76 P.3d at 29.
248. Guinn I, 71 P.3d at 1275; Guinn II, 76 P.2d 32–33. Cf. Hans Linde, What Is a Constitution,
What Is Not, and Why Does It Matter?, 87 OR. L. REV. 717, 728 (2008) (noting if constitution
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just a few years later, Nevada retreated from this interpretational
position, rejecting Guinn’s artificial substantive/procedural distinction
and declaring that the constitution “should be read as a whole, so as to
give effect to and harmonize each provision.”249
3.

Positive Rights Must Be Balanced with the Disfavored
Constitution’s Democratic Protections for Taxpayers

Considered in light of the disfavored constitution, the Washington
State Supreme Court’s new jurisprudence must address how positive
rights create an unavoidable burden for the taxpayer. If a court fails to
enforce a positive right in a foundational document, then arguably that
document loses its primacy, undermining respect for the rule of law.250
At the same time, if the Court takes an enforcement approach that
conflicts with other constitutional provisions, it likewise undermines the
value of the constitution.
This tension hearkens back to the Odysseus analogy: to what higher
values did the voters bind themselves, and subsequent generations, when
they ratified the constitution?251
The paramount duty declares an important constitutional norm of
educational opportunities for children, but the taxing and spending
provisions of state constitutions also declare important norms of
separation of powers, popular representation, and taxpayer protection.
Even if the ratifying voters intended the paramount duty clause to create
judicially enforceable positive rights, these same voters did not delegate
budgeting and taxing authority to the judicial branch. Using positive
rights enforcement to compel expenditures defined by the judiciary
rather than the Legislature conflicts with the disfavored constitution.
Ultimately, the people define the resources that are available to state
government. It is the most fundamental aspect of popular
constitutionalism. They may do so directly through voter-initiated
measures that cut state taxes252 or increase state budget obligations.253
places both expenditures and revenue policies beyond the control of a legislative majority, state
cannot function as a republican government).
249. Beers, 142 P.2d at 348.
250. Usman, supra note 27, at 1530–32.
251. Odysseus’ directive to his sailors did not affect his son Telemachus, for example, or any
future generations home in Ithaca. See Pettys, supra note 172, at 325 (“Those who ratified the
Constitution elected to try to bind not only themselves, but future generations who were not even
parties to the deliberations, as well.”).
252. See 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 141 (repealing tax increases enacted the previous legislative
session).
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They may do so indirectly through the legislatures they choose and the
guidance they provide to those representatives. In turn, these
manifestations of the people’s political power shape the programs
funded by the state in the budget that the legislature must balance among
a host of competing priorities. Collectively, the people get what they pay
for.
Under the Odysseus analogy, the Court in fulfilling its interpretational
task must adhere to the people’s highest values as expressed in the
constitution, rather than to the will of a transitory legislative or popular
majority as expressed in any particular budget, bill, or ballot measure.254
But when the Court, through positive rights interpretation,
constitutionalizes a portion of the state budget, it is also imposing an
unavoidable tax burden on the people, constitutionally dedicating an
unspecified revenue stream to support the right as defined by the Court.
If the right is defined judicially rather than through “supplemental
legislation,” the voters are deprived of a say in how the State establishes
and allocates their tax contributions. Notwithstanding the voters’ policy
and fiscal preferences as expressed in their votes for legislators or ballot
measures, the Court is telling the people that their judicially defined
highest values require billions of dollars in new taxes or in cuts to other
state programs. To illustrate the scope of the legislature’s dilemma, the
budget could eliminate state funding for the entire state higher education
system and still lack sufficient resources to correct the structural salary
shortfall identified in McCleary.255 Notwithstanding the priorities of the
voters and their representatives, the paramount duty clause could
consume all the resources available to government for its other
constitutionally required tasks, from operation of the constitutional state
offices to other possible positive duties,256 as well as essential but not
constitutionally specified programs for public peace, health, and safety.
Given that all constitutional provisions are equally mandatory, and that
all provisions are part of the electoral bargain ratified by the people,
orders in furtherance of the paramount duty do not trump the reservation
of taxing and spending authority to the legislative branch.
253. See 2015 Wash. Sess. Laws 11 (requiring the State to fund additional school staff as part of
the basic education program).
254. See Pettys, supra note 172,(discussing Odysseus analogy).
255. Total state NGFS + Op appropriations in the 2015–2017 budget for state higher education
institutions and financial aid are $3.525 billion, or 9.2 percent of total NGFS + Op appropriations—
about the same amount as one of the lower estimates of the salary shortfall. BUDGET NOTES, supra
note 2, at 305; see supra note 2 (describing shortfall estimates).
256. See Talmadge, Property Absolutism, supra note 38, at 872–76 (listing other possible positive
duties).
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CONCLUSION
In Seattle School District, the Court pledged the State to a unique
positive rights interpretation of the paramount duty clause, but it avoided
the dilemmas of enforcement against the political branches. Now, in
McCleary, the Court has reaffirmed its commitment to a positive
education right, but it has ventured into the “Stygian swamp”257 of
positive rights enforcement against a co-equal branch of state
government, the only branch to which the people delegated the political
authority to levy taxes and to spend the revenue raised thereby. From the
perspective of the state fisc, judicially enforceable positive rights pose
unique risks to separation of powers due to the lack of constitutional
checks to counterbalance the scope of the judicial branch’s
interpretation.
The judicially and statutorily imposed 2018 deadline is approaching.
The Court declared that the Legislature’s failure to provide the judicially
requested “plan” constitutes sanctionable contempt of court. Under SHB
2776, the Legislature has funded its statutorily defined education
enhancements in compliance with their respective statutory due dates.258
Admittedly, the Legislature has not yet corrected the structural shortfall
in state salary allocations, but again, the deadline for funding reform has
not yet elapsed.
If the Court fails to enforce a positive right in the foundational
document, then arguably that document loses its primacy, undermining
respect for the rule of law and for the Court as a branch.259 Yet the same
result occurs if the Court enforces the document selectively, failing to
acknowledge that the delegation of political power in the constitution
itself establishes outer bounds for judicial enforcement of other
constitutional provisions. The disfavored constitution protects both the
Legislature’s fiscal powers and the people’s right to have these decisions
made solely by their elected representatives. The disfavored status of the
fiscal constitution among academics and the judiciary “may be helpful in
reminding us of the need for modesty” in assuming that state
constitutions are a force for judicially defined independent constitutional
257. Neb. Coal. for Ed. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 (Neb. 2007)
(rejecting school funding challenge to avoid “the thickets that can entrap a court that takes on the
duties of a legislature”).
258. See supra note 152 (discussing statutory due dates and implementation steps taken in 2015–
2017).
259. Usman, supra note 27, at 1530–32; see also Tushnet, supra note 44, at 1915 (describing risk
that lack of alignment between strength of right and remedy may create cynicism about
constitution).
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norms.260
An approach that balances positive duties with restrictions in the
disfavored constitution results in greater fealty to the foundational
document’s textual and structural protection for the relationship between
the people and their government. Or, stated differently, “I’m not saying
it doesn’t mean anything. All I am saying is why does it have to mean
everything?”261

260. Briffault, supra note 18, at 957.
261. WHEN HARRY MET SALLY (Columbia Pictures 1989). Compare id., with Tushnet, supra
note 44, at 1898 (“Nonjusticiable rights need not be legally irrelevant.”).

